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LEGALIZING INTELLIGENCE 




Governments face a decision between balancing collective national security interests 
with individual privacy rights and strike that balance to different degrees. Only 
recently has public attention turned to the lack of transparency surrounding cross-
border international intelligence sharing agreements. Foreign intelligence cooper-
ation is necessary for effective security, but differing intelligence governance 
standards create tension between clashing privacy regimes. This Article proposes a 
pragmatic pathway forward in the form of a palatable intelligence-sharing framework 
that respects state sovereignty and security needs, while simultaneously establishing 
revolutionary privacy protections. This first-of-its-kind framework identifies and 
builds upon principles of international law to construct this practical framework. 
These principles are: 1) principle of legality; 2) principle of safeguarding against 
abuse; 3) principle of proportionality; 4) principle of transparency and oversight; 5) 
principle of notification and remedies; 6) principle of complementarity; 7) principle of 
good faith; and 8) an exigency exception. 
*Brian Mund is a 2018 graduate of Yale Law School, where he received his Juris 
Doctor, and a 2013 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, from which he received 
a Bachelor of Arts degree. He is grateful to Professor Michael Reisman and Asaf Lubin 
as well as the 2018 Salzburg Cutler Global Seminar participants for their feedback on 
previous drafts of this Article. All errors are the author's alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Jane Doe shows up at our border with a 
valid visa, but after that visa was issued ... her home 
country learns that she is associated with a terrorist 
organization but doesn't tell us.1 
On April 25, 2018, United States Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, 
defended President Donald Trump's third travel ban -which targets nationals 
from Iran, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela-before the 
Supreme Court on the basis of inadequate information sharing.2 Setting aside 
the merits of this particular order, the case shines a light onto the 
commonplace reality of cross-border information sharing. This snippet above 
reflects the larger reality that in today's world, cross-border information 
sharing plays a vital role in ensuring national security for many states. In 
other words, governments keep their nations safe through exchanges of 
intelligence data. 3 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-
965). 
2 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban To Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 /12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-
court.html. Chad has since been removed from the list countries. See also Trump 138 S. 
Ct. at 2405 (2018) ("Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), the 
President determined that certain entry restrictions were necessary to "prevent the 
entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks 
sufficient information"). 
3 What is data? Merriam-Webster provides the comprehensive definition that data 
is "information in digital form that can be transmitted or processed." While data is a 
plural noun, this Article follows the popular singular constructive use. See Data, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary I data (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2019). Privacy interests arise in data that contains personally identifiable 
information (PII), defined as "[a]ny representation of information that permits the 
identity of an individual to whom the information applies to be reasonably inferred by 
either direct or indirect means." See, e.g., Guidance on the Protection of Personal Identifiable 
Information, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/ppii (last visited Mar. 7, 
2019). While this definition of PII is fairly inclusive, Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove 
identify that "[a]t the same time, there is no uniform definition of PII in information 
privacy law." Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy AndA New 
Concept Of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1814 (2011). 
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Currently, countries share intelligence information through bilateral 
agreements.4 Many of these agreements are secret and do not purport to be 
binding under international law.5 In recent years, multinational intelligence 
exchange has continued to grow.6 However, the public has only limited 
information regarding the extent and details of cooperative intelligence-
sharing operations other than the fact that such cooperation exists. 7 For 
example, the Five Eyes Signal Intelligence Alliance, made up of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand operates 
according to the United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence 
(UKUSA) Agreement, but the last publically available version is from 1955.8 
Taken together, these signs indicate that improvements in international 
intelligence exchange since 9/11 have wrought "a qualitative change" in the 
nature of intelligence cooperation.9 
4 HANS BORN ET AL., MAKING INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
ACCOUNTABLE 62 (2015). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 64; see also Didier Bigo et al., National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation 
and Before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges, in EUR. PARL.: CL., JUSTICE & HOME AFF. 
8 (2014) (describing "a growing transnational exchange of intelligence"); Szabo & Vissy 
v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II 78 (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020 (noting that governments' more and more 
widespread practice of transferring and sharing amongst themselves intelligence 
retrieved by virtue of secret surveillance."); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling all 
United Nations member states to "[e]xchange information in accordance with 
international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters 
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts.") 
7 Craig Forcese, The Collateral Casualties of Collaboration: The Consequence for 
Civil and Human Rights of Transnational Intelligence Sharing 6-11 (Mar. 5, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_ id= 
1354022 (explaining the difficulty to piece together the full scope and extent of 
intelligence arrangements because these agreements are so closely guarded). 
8 See Scarlet Kim et al., The "Backdoor Search Loophole" Isn't Our Only Problem: The 
Dangers of Global Information Sharing, JUST SEC. (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/ 47282/backdoor-search-loophole-isnt-problem-dangers-
global-information-sharing/; see also U.K.-U.S. Communications Intelligence 
Agreement, U.S.-U.K., May 10, 1955, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-
documents/ukusa/ assets/files/new_ ukusa _agree_ 1 Omay55. pdf. 
9 Richard J. Aldrich, Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets 
to an Old Problem, 24 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SEC. 26, 30, 54 (2009). 
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Intelligence sharing has also fallen under increased scrutiny by the 
privacy rights advocacy community. In September 2017, Privacy International 
spearheaded a campaign along with the Center for Democracy & Technology, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
and the Open Technology Institute to "seek increased transparency for 
intelligence sharing arrangements" from over forty governments. 10 
Specifically, the Privacy International coalition has pressed for transparency 
on intelligence sharing, and has also identified intelligence cooperation among 
"the Nine-Eyes (the Five Eyes plus Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Norway), the 14-Eyes (the Nine-Eyes plus Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden), and the 43-Eyes (the 14-Eyes plus the 2010 members of the 
International Security Assistance Forces to Afghanistan)." 11 Other identified 
multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements include EUROPOL between 
the EU member states, the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community between 
European and African states, intelligence cooperation between eleven 
countries in the Great Lakes Region, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, 
10 Letter from Gus Hosein et al., Exec. Director, Privacy Int'l, to Elizabeth B. Collins, 
Board Member, Privacy & Civ. Liberties Board, Re: Oversight of intelligence sharing 
between your government and foreign governments (Sep. 13, 2017), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4000688-US-Open-Letter-on-
Intelligence-Sharing-and.html; see also PRIVACY INT'L, EVIDENCE ON THE DATA 
PROTECTION BILL AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC BILL 
COMMITTEE 6 (2018) (explaining that "[t]he Bill provides for almost unfettered powers 
for cross-border transfers of personal data by intelligence agencies without appropriate 
levels of protection.") https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201719/ cmpublic/ 
data protection/ memo/ dpb07. pdf. 
11 Privacy International Launches International Campaign For Greater Transparency 
Around Secretive Intelligence Sharing Activities Between Governments, PRIVACY INT'L (Oct. 
23, 2017), 
https ://www.privacyinternational.org/press-release/51/pri vacy-international-launches 
-international-campaign-greater-transparency-around [hereinafter Privacy Inter-
national]; see also Scarlet Kim et al., Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance 
and What They Tell Us about Intelligence-Sharing Agreements, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-
what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing (describing pressure for US disclosure of 
secret intelligence agreements). 
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and an anti-Islamic State intelligence sharing coalition of Russia, Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria.12 
This Article responds to the demand for greater intelligence sharing 
accountability by offering a detailed and thorough governmental intelligence 
cooperation framework. This type of pragmatic, compromising approach is 
sorely missing from a literature filled with idealistic yet wholly impractical 
measures. With intelligence sharing propelled under the public spotlight with 
renewed vigor in late 2017, the time is ripe for such an intervention. This 
Article offers a pragmatic pathway forward for governments and activists in 
the form of a palatable proposal that respects state sovereignty and security 
needs while simultaneously establishing revolutionary privacy protections. 
The Article further emphasizes the distinct tension that arises from 
government intelligence sharing of personal information. This tension 
primarily arises when government intelligence agencies transfer information 
related to national security threats: specifically, cross-border intelligence 
transfers to combat serious crime and national security threats. 13 Government 
intelligence transfers occur most frequently among allied countries,14 but as 
12 See Human Rights Implications of Intelligence Sharing, PRIVACY INT'L (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/ default/files/2017-11/PI-Briefing-to-
N ational-Intelligence-Oversight_ 0. pdf; Stephane Lefebvre, The Difficulties and 
Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation, 16 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 527, 529-534 (2003). 
13 Privacy-security tradeoff considerations are also engaged during inter-
governmental law enforcement data sharing and involve information transfers to one 
another for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and related matters. 
These transfers usually occur through the formalized process outlined within a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). See generally 2012 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012) https://www.state.gov/ 
j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm (detailing United States' use of MLATs). A 
considerable literature has been emerging over the appropriate process for MLAT 
reform. See infra note 186. While MLAT reform poses an important step to strengthen 
the international data sharing regime, law enforcement sharing, and intelligence 
sharing are most appropriately addressed separately for reasons addressed infra, notes 
211-286. 
14 See, e.g., Data Protection Bill, 20 Mar. 2018, Parl Deb HL (2018) col. 161 (UK), 
https ://hansard. parliament. uk/Commons/2018-03-20 I debates/ c72d5ec6-a472-4c53-
be4c-8c80f291 bd2f/DataProtectionBill(Lords )(FifthSitting) (quoting Victoria Atkins in 
saying that "[i]n the vast majority of cases, intelligence sharing takes place with 
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the Trump v. Hawaii oral argument transcript suggests, not exclusively.15 These 
transfers directly engage profound questions with respect to the proper 
relationship between actions taken in the name of national security and 
ensuring appropriate privacy protections for the dissemination of private 
information. Intelligence sharing between foreign intelligence agencies 
provides tangible national security benefits. However, such benefits must be 
balanced against the costs to privacy and open expression. 
The world of intelligence sharing is understandably opaque. Hans Born, 
Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills provide a useful taxonomy for conceptualizing 
international intelligence cooperation, and this paper adopts their thoughtful 
framework. 16 Born et al. identifies five types of international intelligence 
cooperation: 1) information sharing, 2) covert operational cooperation, 3) 
hosting facilities and equipment, 4) training and capacity building, and 5) 
providing software and equipment.17 This paper focuses on the first type: 
information sharing. Information sharing includes strategic information, 
operational information, and tactical information. Strategic information 
includes policy analyses related to foreign policy developments or larger 
security trends.18 Operational information generally involves threat 
assessments of groups' or actors' current capabilities, and unlike policy-
oriented strategic analyses, tends to be directed at security personnel. Finally, 
tactical information relates to the specifics relevant for current operations -
the specific details necessary for answering the "who, what, where, when, and 
how."19 
Shared intelligence information splits into two further subcategories: 
"raw intelligence" or an analyzed "end product."20 Raw intelligence has not 
been altered from its initial collection form, whereas the "end product" has 
countries with which the intelligence services have long-standing and well-established 
relationships."). 
15 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) 
(No. 17-965). 
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already received initial treatment by intelligence operatives. The sensitivity 
of the collection source will impact the likelihood of raw data sharing, as will 
the relationship between the two agencies. Lastly, the process of information 
sharing can manifest in two distinct forms. Most often, information sharing is 
"reactive," and results from ad hoc requests from a foreign partner for any 
information on a given subject. 21 However, close allies may also share 
information on an /1 automated basis." 22 These arrangements may rely on joint 
databases or other shared receptacles of gathered intelligence information. 
I. EXISTENCE OF PRIVACY-
SECURITY TRADEOFF 
Throughout the world, people care deeply about their privacy. Common-law 
courts have long recognized the importance of privacy from governmental 
intrusion. This long-standing common law principle announces, "the house 
of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense against 
injury and violence as for his repose." 23 As expounded by American courts, 
the privacy right allows one "to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 24 For European countries, 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights grants "[e]veryone .. 
. the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence." 25 Many other countries also protect the privacy of its 
citizens. For example, Articles 23-25 of the Russian Constitution grant 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905). 
24 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) 
25 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter "European Convention on Human 
Rights"]. European Courts have also explicitly held that that private life "includes 
personal identity, such as a person's name, and that the protection of personal data is 
of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his right to respect for private 
life." Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I-
11063, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ document/ document.jsf?text=&docid=80291 &pagelndex= 
O&doclang=en&mode= lst&dir=&occ=first&part= 1&cid=1680697. 
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substantial privacy rights, including the protection against "the collection, 
keeping, use and dissemination of information about the private life of a 
person." 26 Article 40 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
notes that "freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People's 
Republic of China are protected by law." 27 In August 2017, the Indian 
Supreme Court overturned its precedent and unanimously declared, "The 
right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal 
liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of 
the Constitution."28 Notwithstanding this background of general respect for 
privacy rights, government security practices threaten to intrude upon 
citizens' rights. 
However, the very purpose of privacy rights continues to be a source of 
debate among various countries. The debate over the contours and purpose 
of privacy rights does not map along a simple East-West or North-South 
divide; for example, scholars have recognized "two western cultures of 
privacy" 29 with fundamentally different approaches to privacy and 
surveillance.30 Recent scholarship has also recognized that China's unique 
cultural and historical foundation of privacy have generated a wholly 
26 RUSSIAN CONST., art. 23-25, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm. 
27 CHINESE CONST., March 14, 2004, art. 40, http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/law/ 
const03.html. 
28 Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors., (2017) Writ 
Petition (Civ.), No. 494 of 2012, http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/supremecourt/ 
2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf. 
29 See generally James Whitman, The Two Western Culture of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004). 
30 See David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United 
States, the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 INT'L J. CONST. 
L. 220, 237 (2016). For an informative survey of 13 countries' surveillance and data 
privacy laws, see generally Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both The Eu And 
The U.S. Are "Stricter" Than Each Other For The Privacy Of Government Requests For 
Information, 66 EMORY L. J. 617 (2017) http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-
66/issue-3/articles/both-eu-us-stricter-privacy-requests-information.html; Ira S. 
Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis, 
4 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 96 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipu004. 
9 
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different conception of privacy.31 These fundamentally different views of 
privacy have prevented the formation of any internationally accepted right to 
privacy or data protection.32 Even among the subset of countries that 
recognize such rights, deep disagreement persists over the appropriate scope 
or content of those rights, and the appropriate role of courts in reviewing 
security practices.33 
If the expansion of privacy rights were purely a positive-sum-game, then 
few would oppose the implementation of greater individual privacy 
protections. However, as alluded to above, privacy protections come at a cost 
to security interests, and vice versa. 34 Government security interests 
encourage information-gathering tactics that impose limitations on citizens' 
interests in their privacy and family life, as well as their "right to be let 
alone."35 Furthermore, the fear of government surveillance may chill 
31 See generally Tiffany Li et al., Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, 
J. L. INFO. & Ser. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826087. 
32 See, e.g., Bert-Jaap Koops & Morag Goodwin, Cyberspace, the Cloud, and Cross-
Border Criminal Investigation. The Limits and Possibilities of International Law 1, 47 
(Tilburg L. Sch., Research Paper No. 5/2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698263 (stating, in relevant part, that "there is no universally 
shared content for the right to privacy or data protection at the international level."); 
Data Protection Bill, 10 October 2017, Parl Deb HL (2017) col. 785 (UK), 
https://hansard. parliament. uk/Lords/2017-10-10/ debates/ A0271 CAB-90BC-49BD-
B284-664918EE70CA/DataProtectionBill(HL) (quoting the Earl of Lytton in saying, 
"[a]s regards international cross-jurisdictional data- I am thinking of beyond the 
EU - I wonder how successfully the proposed arrangements will carry forward in the 
longer term, bearing in mind that the world market contains numerous players who 
for their own purposes and advantage might not be that keen to match the standards 
we claim to set for ourselves."). 
33 Id. 
34 As former President Barack Obama put it, "You can't have 100% security and also 
then have 100% privacy and zero inconvenience, ... we're going to have to make some 
choices as a society." Peter Nicholas & Siobhan Gorman, Obama Defends Surveillance, 
WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578531742264893564. 
35 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R. 193, 193 
(1890). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Oct. 10, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 02, http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/8-protection-personal-
data (stating, in relevant part, that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of 
personal data concerning him or her."). Such an approach views one's personal 
10 
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individual freedoms of speech, assembly, and association.36 On the other 
hand, privacy protective measures that reduce government access to 
information-gathering methods could hamstring efforts to identify and thwart 
dangerous threats to the societies' collective security interests. 37 Accordingly, 
the government mandate to ensure the safety of its citizenry requires the 
government to undertake some behaviors that intrude into the sphere of 
personal privacy.3s 
information as commensurate with ownership over one's identity and sense of self. 
Allowing governments to share that information can be deeply injurious to one's sense 
of identity. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 
(2013 ), https ://harvardlawreview .org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol 126 _co hen. pdf 
(stating, in relevant part, that "[s]ubjectivity is a function of the interplay between 
emergent selfhood and social shaping; privacy, which inheres in the interstices of social 
shaping, is what permits that interplay to occur."). 
36 There are several famous examples from United States' jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) 
("The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked 
surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter 
vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. 
For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society."); 
see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[a]wareness that the Government may be watching 
chills associational and expressive freedoms."). Researchers have sought to show that 
the fear of government surveillance does in fact change citizen behavior. See Brynne 
O'Neal, What Americans Actually Do When the Government Is Watching, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jul. 20, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynne-oneal/what-americans-
actually-do-when-the-government-is-watching_b_7833408.html; see also BORN ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 45. 
37 [Irish] Data Prot. Comm'r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems [2016 
No. 4809 P.], 40 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf ("A 
degree of surveillance for the purposes of national security, counterterrorism and 
combating serious crime is vital for the safeguarding of the freedoms of all citizens of 
the union. This necessarily involves interference with the right to privacy, including 
data privacy."). 
38 As former FBI Agent Asha Rangappa explains, "[a]s any law enforcement official 
will tell you, criminals and spies don't show up on the doorstep of law enforcement 
with all of their evidence and motives neatly tied up in a bow. Cases begin with leads, 
tips, or new information obtained in the course of other cases .... However, anytime 
the FBI receives a credible piece of information that could indicate a potential violation 
of the law or a threat to national security, it has a legal duty determine whether a basis 
for further investigation exists." Asha Rangappa, Don't Fall for the Hype: How the FBI's 
11 
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The privacy-security tradeoff is not a new phenomenon. In the prelude to 
the American independence, colonial Americans well understood the 
"difficult tradeoff between safety and freedom." 39 As Alexander Hamilton 
argued: 
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the 
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, 
will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose 
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their 
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become 
willing to run the risk of being less free. 40 
The challenge that Hamilton faced was the same difficulty that 
government decision makers continue to struggle with today: where to strike 
the appropriate tradeoffs between privacy and security.41 As the British 
government recently declared, "There are circumstances where the processing 
of data is vital for our economy, our democracy and to protect us against 
illegality."42 Today, the question facing states involves grappling with: 
how [do] we get the balance right between protecting the freedoms 
and civil liberties that underpin our functioning liberal democracy 
Use of Section 702 Surveillance Data Really Works, JUST SEC. (Nov 29, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/47428/dont-fall-hype-702-fbi-works. Inevitably, some of 
these suspicions will not translate into actual threats to national security or even legal 
infractions. This necessary reality of overreach means that bulk data searches must be 
"adequately authorised and limited by domestic law." BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 70. 
Presently, such protection "seems to be the exception rather than the norm". Id. 
39 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (providing, in relevant part, that "[t]he Bill of Rights 
speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of 
those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause 
invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful 
balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order."). 
40 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 8, p. 33). 
41 See Eugene Volokh, Liberty, Safety, and Benjamin Franklin, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/ll/ll/ 
liberty-safety-and-benjamin-franklin (emphasizing that the "real challenge is in 
deciding which tradeoffs are wise and which are foolish."). 
42 Dep't Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Data Laws To Be Made Fit For Digital Age, UK 
Gov. (Sep. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/data-laws-to-be-made-fit-
for-digital-age. 
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while protecting that democracy from the various threats to our 
safety and well-being. The sophisticated use of new technologies by 
terrorist groups and organised crime means that we have to make a 
sober assessment of exactly what powers our police and security 
services need to combat the terrorist attack and disrupt the drug or 
people trafficker or the money launderer. The fact that those threats 
are often overlapping and interconnected makes granting powers 
and achieving appropriate checks and balances ever more difficult.43 
When Hamilton considered this question, the debate concerned a wholly 
domestic issue. The Continental Congress had to engage in introspection and 
begin carving a tradeoff consonant with American values. The national nature 
of this decision meant that different sovereign countries could strike different 
tradeoffs without friction. However, the privacy-security tradeoff for modern, 
international intelligence sharing changes that paradigm. 
States' national privacy-security balance generates difficult decisions 
when considering information-sharing arrangements with other 
governments. While the privacy concerns are considerable, state security 
interests mandate cooperative data sharing as a crucial component of state 
practice. Before exploring solutions to conflicting surveillance regimes, the 





A. Intelligence Sharing Raises Privacy Concerns 
As outlined above, domestic privacy protections play an important role in 
limiting government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens. 44 
43 Data Protection Bill, 10 October 2017, Parl Deb HL (2017) col. 785 (UK), 
https://hansard. parliament. uk/lords/2017-10-10/ debates/22188EC1 -6BAB-4F06-BE64-
5831ABAF78E2/DataProtectionBill(HL ). 
44 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 
46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 397 (1973) ("Much intelligence inevitably touches upon the private 
lives and pursuits of individuals and its dissemination is bound to have at least some 
adverse effects."). 
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Unchecked intrusion threatens to chill the important freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and association.45 If these fears arise from one's own government 
surveillance, a fortiori, they are exponentially amplified by data sharing with 
foreign governments.46 Every citizen enjoys national citizenship47 and retains 
the peace of mind that their national government owes some obligations and 
fealty to protect the interests of their own nationals.48 No such commitment 
exists for foreign government actors, and citizens have no reason to expect 
foreign governments to consider foreign citizens' interests when accessing 
personal data.49 To the contrary, if a government receives private information 
that allows it to further its own national interests at the foreign citizen's 
expense, that government would assuredly do so. Thus, the government's 
data sharing practices with foreign governments jeopardize its citizens' 
private sense of security, a feeling further enhanced by foreign governments' 
freedom to further circulate the private information. 50 
Of course, one should not discount the possibility that not only will fear 
create chilling effects but that the private information might actually be used 
to stifle the above-mentioned rights. Regimes may utilize shared information 
45 See supra notes 23-36. 
46 See, e.g., Privacy Int'l, supra note 11 ("States may share intelligence with States 
known for violating international law, .... Such sharing can place individuals in those 
States at particular risk."). 
47 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, Aug. 
30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175. 
48 See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal et al., Nationality and Human Rights, 83 YALE L. J. 900, 
960 (1974) (stating that "on the transnational level[,] nationality is the right to have 
protection in rights"). 
49 See, e.g., Robin Simcox, Europe, Stop Trying to Make 'Intelligence Sharing' Happen, 
FOREIGNPOL'Y (Apr. 14, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/europe-stop-trying-
to-mak-brussels-paris-bombings ("Brits may have become used to the CCTV cameras 
and Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology that allows their own 
government to monitor their travel-but they would be considerably more dubious 
about letting the Germans and the French do the same."). 
so See generally Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The 
Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & PoL'Y 473 (2016), 
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/u ploads/2016/11/Law _Enforcement_ Access_ to_ Data_ 
Across_Borders_2.pdf (detailing ways through which collection of private information 
can stifle rights and freedoms). 
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to monitor political dissidents or regime opponents living as part of a foreign 
diaspora community.51 Such privacy and even safety concerns may pose a 
barrier to data sharing agreements with countries bearing shaky human rights 
records.52 Even when shared information would not lead to concrete harm, 
countries may also hesitate to share information to partners with poor privacy 
safeguards due to the belief that the mere access to the private information 
constitutes severe dignitary harm. 
Similar considerations also weigh in favor of caution before utilizing 
shared data received from an intelligence partner. If the intelligence partner 
does not honor the same degree of privacy as the home state, the home state 
may fear complicity in privacy or human rights violations. 53 The "Originator 
Rule" allows the original collector of information to govern the subsequent 
downstream flow of the information.54 If an intelligence agency receives 
information from a foreign counterpart, the information originator may 
choose to not include the sources or procedures by which the agency acquired 
this information. As such, the recipient agency may unknowingly utilize 
private information that was unlawfully gathered under foreign laws. 
Agencies can also take advantage of disparate protective regimes through 
the deliberate use of a "revolving door" tactic. The "revolving door" describes 
a mechanism through which government intelligence agencies rely on foreign 
51 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 45. By the same token, however, sharing information 
about domestic dissidents might have a significantly smaller chilling effect. American 
political dissidents might fear retaliatory action by the United States yet would 
probably be far less concerned about repercussions from a removed country like China. 
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy? Be Careful What You Wish 
For, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 238 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mow013; Ashley 
Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 346 (2015) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2490700; Asaf Lubin, 'We Only Spy on Foreigners': The Myth of 
a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 CHI. J. INT'L L. 
502, 534 (2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008428 ("Chinese, French, and Russian 
intelligence agents do not have the time or inclination to harass random Americans, 
nor the capability as long as Americans remain in the United States."). 
52 Lefebvre, supra note 12, at 535. 
53 AIDAN WILLS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 25 (2010), 
http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IntelligenceOversight_ 
en.pd£. 
54 Lubin, supra note 51. 
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collection to collect information that they could not have legally collected 
under their domestic legal frameworks.ss This is not merely an abstract 
concern. Part 0 describes the United States' lack of privacy protection for non-
U.S. citizens located abroad. Insofar as foreign intelligence partners such as 
the Five Eyes coalition have access to United States intelligence databases, U.S. 
overseas collection practices may directly facilitate a legal quagmire for those 
foreign agencies.s6 While the bulk collection may have been legal under 
United States law, these partners might not have legal authorization to collect 
such information. The revolving door is not a one-way street: the Wall Street 
Journal has also reported that Europeans have also collected intelligence 
information for American intelligence agencies.s7 As David Cole and Federico 
Fabrinni note, "Reports of cooperation and mass intelligence sharing between 
the NSA and the General Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), the United 
Kingdom's surveillance agency, make these concerns even more 
immediate."ss Thus, intelligence sharing agreements should account for the 
legitimate privacy interests implicated in inter-governmental data transfers. 
B. Effective Security Requires Intelligence Sharing 
Policing and counterterrorism efforts necessarily depend on cross-border data 
sharing.s9 The modern era has ushered in an age of advanced communications 
technologies and increasingly sophisticated threats that do not confine 
themselves to national borders. In the globalized 21st century, effective 
national security practices require not only data access among national law 
55 Id. 
56 See Kim et al., supra note 8. 
57 Adam Entous & Siobhan Gorman, Europeans Shared Spy Data With U.S., WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-says-france-spain-aided-nsa-
spying-1383065709. 
58 Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 222. 
59 Andrew Keane Woods, Against DataExceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 742 (2016) 
(stating, in relevant part, that "Governments seek lawful access to Internet data for a 
host of reasons, including counterterrorism operations, immigration control, and many 
other administrative matters."). 
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enforcement and intelligence agencies but also cooperative data sharing with 
international intelligence partners. 60 
In today's global economy, the idea of data fails to comport with 
traditional borders, and security threats have adopted a transnational nature. 61 
As Professor Jennifer Daskal points out, "The ease and speed with which data 
travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical 
disconnect between where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test 
these foundational premises [of territoriality]." 62 In a world of non-territorial 
data, blocking foreign security data streams can have significantly adverse 
consequences. As President Obama observed, "[E]merging threats from 
terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction place 
new and in some ways more complicated demands on our intelligence 
agencies. Globalization and the Internet made these threats more acute, as 
technology erased borders and empowered individuals to project great 
violence .... "63 One Irish Court recently recognized that limitations on legal 
60 Id. at 745 ("This is striking: a police officer now must cross an international border 
in order to do her job, whereas twenty or even ten years ago, the same officer might 
have been able to investigate a routine crime like kidnapping without leaving her 
country. Just as crime has become increasingly global, evidence gathering has followed 
suit."). This trend has long been in the works. See McDougal et al., supra note 44, at 
424 (noting that increasing global interrelation has "rendered intelligence gathering a 
global operation requiring more institutional and ad hoc cooperation across political 
boundaries."). 
61 But see Woods, supra note 59, at 763 ("At a deep conceptual level, data is not as 
novel as the data exceptionalists suggest. None of the features that are thought to make 
data novel are in fact novel-whether the features are considered individually or as a 
whole-and in fact, data is an easier case than some other assets because data has a 
physical location wherever it is stored"). 
62 Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015). 
63 Ashley Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 
102 VA. L. REV. 599, 622 (2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2768339 (citing Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, 
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE PRESS SEC'Y (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https :// obamawhi tehouse .archives .gov /the-press-office/2014/01/17 /remarks-
president-review-signals-intelligence ). 
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security sharing "has potentially extremely significant implications for the 
safety and security of residents within the European Union." 64 
This reflects a larger truth that as transnational integration has developed, 
so too has state susceptibility to intervention or interruption by individuals 
located around the world. As criminal activity takes an increasingly 
international flavor, 65 domestic information alone proves insufficient to 
provide safety in the twenty-first century. This position does not merely 
reflect theoretical rhetoric arising from the desire to shape the modern global 
citizen. Rather, this position has been cemented by empirical experience: it is 
widely accepted among the global intelligence community that international 
data sharing incidents have contributed to saving many lives. 66 To highlight 
one well-cited example, Canada's refusal to accept Indian intelligence 
information regarding a threat of homegrown Canadian Sikh extremist 
nationalists resulted in the destruction of Air India Flight 182 and cost 329 
lives.67 
In addition to preventing the loss of life, intelligence-sharing agreements 
provide a number of important benefits. Intelligence sharing with foreign 
governments helps provide a more complete picture of often-cryptic 
circumstances that allow "military commanders, law enforcement officials, 
64 [Irish] Data Prot. Comm'r, v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems [2016 
No. 4809 P.], 3 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf. 
65 For example, "between October 2014 and September 2015, the UK Financial 
Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) received 1,566 requests from international partners for 
financial intelligence. Of these, at least 800 came from EU Member States. In the same 
period, the UKFIU proactively disseminated 571 pieces of financial intelligence to 
international financial intelligence units, 200 of which went to Europol." The Exchange 
and Protection of Personal Data: A Future Partnership Paper, HM Gov'T (2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6398 
53/The_exchange_and_protection_of_personal_data.pdf; see also Woods, supra note 59, 
at 744-745 (2016) (presenting U.K. Government Requests for Internet Data from Major 
U.S. Service Providers in 2014). 
66 See, e.g., BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 33 ("[I]nternational intelligence cooperation 
can help to safeguard the right to life, and it can prevent serious threats to public safety. 
It is widely accepted that information sharing has contributed to the prevention of 
numerous terrorist attacks over the past decade, saving many lives.") 
67 See id. at 41 (citing COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING 
OF AIR INDIA FLIGHT 182, 422-31 (2010)). 
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and policymakers to improve the quality of their decision making." 68 
Additionally, data sharing provides for significant cost-savings and enables 
operational efficiencies. Data sharing delivers benefits in the division of labor, 
reducing the burden of duplicative investigative efforts, and leveraging 
specialized areas of expertise.69 Take the example of human intelligence.70 As 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State loses the last of its territory and resources, 
many fear that it will increasingly turn its focus to conducting international 
terrorism.71 As such, governments who fear that they are potential targets will 
seek to place clandestine operatives within the organization or recruit 
informants. Such measures are extremely costly, and the duplication of effort 
may itself compromise the efficacy of individual missions. Moreover, certain 
governments will have comparative advantages-in this scenario, Middle 
Eastern governments will likely have more native language speakers and 
citizens with plausible ties to the region or conflict. At first glance, the ISIS 
case might seem distinguishable from the privacy concerns explored in this 
Article. However, even in this extreme scenario of the Islamic State, the 
Islamic State's international ambitions involve cross-border communications 
and association with and surveillance of individuals located around the world. 
When intelligence agencies can engage in information sharing, they benefit 
from the collective efficiencies. 
68 Id. at 34. 
69 Id. at 36 ("Close allies can work to avoid duplication of information collection 
efforts . . .. It may be easier for a service to work with a foreign partner whose 
intelligence officials and/or agents share these [specialized] characteristics"); Janine 
McGruddy, Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight, 6 J. 
STRATEGIC SEC. 214, 215 (2013) http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article= 1317 &context=jss ("No one country can effectively cover all the areas of interest 
that their intelligence collection requirements demand.") 
70 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is defined by the Central Intelligence Agency as 
"any information that can be gathered from human sources." INTelligence: Human 
Intelligence, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last updated Apr. 30, 2013), 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archi ve/2010-featured-story-
archive/intelligence-human-intelligence .html. 
71 See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Beyond Iraq and Syria: ISIS' Ability to Conduct Attacks Abroad, 
LAWFARE (Jun. 15, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-iraq-and-
syria-isis-ability-conduct-attacks-abroad ("This loss of territory and resources, 
however, increases the Islamic State's desire to conduct international terrorism."). 
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Intelligence sharing practices also lead to security improvements by 
effectuating peer review.72 The nature of intelligence-sharing work can often 
insulate such practices from substantive agency review by other areas of the 
government. Through coordination with foreign government agencies, 
intelligence sharing establishes an avenue for an outside party to provide the 
intelligence agency with professional feedback. In doing so, intelligence-
sharing agreements play an invaluable role in providing an objective and 
critical review of practices that lay "largely shielded" from external review. 73 
While peer review provides a helpful informal model for intelligence 
feedback, it should not serve as the only source of oversight-an issue that 
receives extensive attention infra. 
Finally, intelligence-sharing agreements permit governments to control 
the external information flow to other governments. Through such 
arrangements, governments can tailor the amount of information that they 
share with partners and can withhold sensitive material or titrate the 
circumstances in which they distribute such information. Cooperation can 
limit the degree to which foreign governments expend the resources to surveil 
non-citizens, thereby decreasing the risk of incidental foreign espionage 
threatening national security. These positive externalities of lessened foreign 
government espionage have encouraged even privacy advocates to push for 
data sharing regimes motivated by the belief that agreements will bolster 
citizens' protections against foreign government surveillance.74 
72 See Deeks supra note 63, at 640. 
73 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 36 ("Exchanging information and intelligence analyses 
with foreign partners can provide services with alternative perspectives on key issues 
and help them to challenge their own assumptions ... the professional criticism that 
foreign partners can provide may be invaluable. Accordingly, services with close 
relationships will sometimes solicit comments on their strategic analyses.") 
74 See Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 236-37. 
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Ill. COUNTRIES STRIKE 
DIFFERENT PRIVACY-
SECURITY BALANCES FOR 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
REGIMES 
While popular imagery may paint a privacy-loving Europe and a security-
obsessed United States, the reality is that when it comes to government 
surveillance, experts have recognized that /1 [ s] afeguards under American law, 
for all their shortcomings, are far more robust than those now found or likely 
to emerge elsewhere," including in Europe.75 European Union member states 
themselves hold widely varying views on the appropriate tradeoff balance on 
"such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of 
suspect-specific judicial approval ex-ante, and the degree to which 
transparency and oversight." 76 
Taken holistically, EU law provides substantially more protection against 
government surveillance in three ways. First, it does not accept the third-party 
doctrine found in American jurisprudence, which robs individuals of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy-in other words, a privacy interest-in 
information that has been revealed to a third party.77 The third-party doctrine 
has led American courts to reject a privacy interest in information given to a 
third party "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose." 78 The EU also imposes greater privacy 
75 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245. See, e.g., Entous & Gorman, supra note 57, 
(statement of Rep. Mike Rogers) ("[The U.S. is] the only intelligence service in the world 
that is forced to go to a court before they even collect on foreign intelligence operations, 
which is shocking to me."). 
76 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245 ("There is wide variation, even among Western 
democracies, on such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of 
suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree to which transparency and 
oversight are relaxed in the national security context."). 
77 Id. 
78 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). However, the United States 
jurisprudence on the third-party doctrine may be shifting for online information. See, 
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (limiting the scope of third-party 
doctrine by requiring a warrant for cell phone geo-location data lasting longer than a 
week); see also Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 
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restrictions on the private sector, including limitations on the retention and 
use of data and has recognized a right to be forgotten. 79 The EU is also subject 
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the Court has built a 
considerable foundation for privacy protection, including a right against 
secret monitoring of postal and telephonic communications, 80 real-time 
communications interceptions,81 and bulk data collection.82 However, the 
ECtHR maintained wide discretion to state actors by granting a "margin of 
appreciation" in the national security and surveillance context. 83 
That is not to say that the United States is insensitive to privacy concerns; 
the central understanding of American privacy arises from the notion of 
freedom from state surveillance. 84 In three other ways, American law provides 
more privacy protections than the EU for government intelligence. First, while 
American law requires FISA authorization, EU law does not require judicial 
oversight.85 Second, EU law does not require individualized suspicion for 
intelligence searches, which allows for greater bulk collection flexibility than 
is allowed in the U.S.86 Third, EU law lacks "the detailed specificity of the US 
19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 238, 256-57 (2017) http://yjolt.org/sites/default/files/ 
mund19yjolt238_0.pdf (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated a 
willingness to reconsider the third party doctrine for digital information). 
79 Schulhofer supra note 51, at 249. 
so Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), Judgment (1978), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng ?i=OOl -57510. 
81 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (telephone 
interception); Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617 /00, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment 
(2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-79996 (email interception). 
82 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2000), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-58586; Marper v. United Kingdom, Apps. No. 
30562/04 & 30566/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng ?i =001-90051. 
83 Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 227. 
84 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L. J. 1151, 1211-13 (2004), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/246_ftn7jo8w.pdf 
("Suspicion of the state has always stood at the foundation of American privacy 
thinking."). 
85 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 249. 
86 Id at 249-50. 
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)," which has left national security 
practices largely unregulated.87 
However, the U.S. Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" 88 is not absolute, and the United States has shifted 
towards a greater security emphasis in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks. Most notably, the USA PATRIOT Act89 has realigned the balance 
between the government and American citizens over the scope of reasonable 
privacy intrusions for national security purposes.90 The PATRIOT Act 
included provisions that added a broad new definition of domestic terrorism 
under 18 U.S.C. § 233191 and allowed for delayed notice for certain searches 
and interceptions,92 thereby facilitating extended covert operations. 93 
Furthermore, the United States has extended Fourth Amendment procedural 
protections for domestic national security gathering94 and has prevented the 
bulk data collection of all American telephone metadata records.95 The United 
States offers much less protection to non-U.S. persons located abroad and has 
87 Id. at 250. 
88 U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. 
89 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272, 272-75. 
90 Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy under 
the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 379 (2002) ("The PATRIOT Act attacks the 
balance between the government and the individual by a systematic circumvention of 
established doctrine and procedures guarding against unreasonable governmental 
intrusion"). 
91 See18 U.S.C. § 2331; Patriot Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong.§ 802 (2001). 
92 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a). 
93 USA Freedom Act: What's In, What's Out, WASH. POST (Jun. 2, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/usa-freedom-act (stating that the 
USA Freedom Act reauthorized the PATRIOT Act while modifying some of the 
government's bulk data collection powers). See generally USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, 
Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 267 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ 
house-bill/2048? q={%22search%22%3A[%22 \ %22hr2048 \ %22%22]}. 
94 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) 
(holding government's national security concerns "do not justify departure in this case 
from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to 
initiation of a search or surveillance."). 
95 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(interpreting §215 of the PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, to not authorize bulk data 
collection of American telephone records). 
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authorized extensive foreign collection data collection, even if the data also 
captures communications concerning persons located within the United 
States.96 
The United States and Europe also differ in their approach to judicial 
review.97 The European Union tilts heavily towards judicial engagement to 
protect individual privacy rights. 98 The contrast between the United States 
and European Union approach on the scope of judicial reviewability shines 
through a conclusion by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR). Rather than allow substantive privacy interests to 
narrow legitimate national security methods, the FISCR judges instead 
recognized that "where the government has instituted several layers of 
96 United States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749, at *15 (D. Or. June 24, 2014), aff'd, 
843 F.3d 420, 440 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The§ 702 acquisition targeting a non-U.S. person 
overseas is constitutionally permissible, so, under the general rule, the incidental 
collection of defendant's communications with the extraterritorial target would be 
lawful."). See also Redacted, 2011 WL 10945618, at *27 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(providing, in relevant part, that "incidental collections occurring as a result of 
constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful."). 
President Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 added additional safeguards for 
non-U.S. citizens located abroad and required that "signals intelligence activities must 
take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect[.]" See also 
Presidential Policy Directive No. 28, Signals Intelligence Activities § 1 (Jan. 17, 2014) 
[hereinafter PPD-28], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/17 /presidential-policy-directi ve-signals-intelligence-acti vi ties. 
97 This difference has been characterized as a "ballot-box democracy" in the U.S. 
versus a "fundamental rights" model of judicial review in Europe. See Francesca 
Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to Privacy and 
National Security Surveillance at 19, in EYAL BENVENISTI & GEORG NOLTE, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE IN COMMUNITY INTERESTS ACROSS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming), https://scholarship.law .gwu.edu/ cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi ?referer= https ://scholar .google. com/ &httpsredir= 1 &article=2562&context=facul ty _ 
publications. 
98 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland & Others v 
Minister for Communications, Marine & Natural Resources and Others, E.C.J., 
Judgment (Grand Chamber Apr. 8, 2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0293&from=EN (holding that "EU 
legislature's discretion is reduced" because of the fundamental right to respect for 
private life, the government's stated legitimate interest in national security 
notwithstanding.). 
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serviceable safeguards to protect individuals against unwarranted harms and 
to minimize incidental intrusions, its efforts to protect national security should 
not be frustrated by the courts." 99 
Neither the United States nor the European Union represents the full 
range in which states establish their privacy-security tradeoff. For example, 
Japan has traditionally sat at the extreme "privacy" end of the privacy-security 
spectrum.100 The Japanese government's ability to engage in surveillance and 
interception practices has been highly curtailed, including for national 
security purposes.101 Japan has a wiretap law, but "Japanese culture strongly 
opposes government interceptions, and the authority is rarely used."102 Until 
June 2017, Japan did not have a statutory basis for authorizing 
communications interceptions for counter-terrorism purposes.103 However, 
Japan's robust privacy anti-interception laws do not translate to a complete 
lack of authorization for counter-terror activity. In 2016, the Japanese 
Supreme Court granted $880,000 to Muslim plaintiffs for privacy violations 
related to a leak of police files that revealed blanket surveillance of religious 
Muslims in Japan.104 Nevertheless, Japan's Supreme Court affirmed a lower 
99 In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
551F.3d1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
100 See Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104 ("At the opposite extreme, Japan and 
Brazil are notable for the severe limits they impose on interceptions undertaken for 
foreign intelligence security purposes."). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 109 ("Japanese society strongly disfavours the use of wiretaps and the 
number of communications intercepts is miniscule."). See also Toshimaru Ogura, 
Toward Global Communication Rights: Movements Against Wiretapping and Monitoring in 
Japan, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (2018), https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/2691 (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
103 Andy Sharp, Abe Passes Controversial Bill Boosting Japan Surveillance Powers, 
BLOOMBERG (Jun. 14, 201710:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
06-15/ abe-passes-controversial-bill-boosting-japan-surveillance-powers; Rubinstein et 
al., supra note 30, at 109 ("Japanese law lacks any statutory basis for authorizing 
wiretaps for counter-terrorism purposes."). 
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court ruling permitting intelligence profiling and surveillance as "necessary 
and inevitable" to guard against the threat of international terrorism.ms 
At the other end of the spectrum, China and India heavily subordinate 
privacy interests to possible security needs in a way that neither the United 
States, the European Union, nor Japan would find appropriate. Both China 
and India are distinguished by their /1 almost total" lack of privacy protection 
from government monitoring and oversight. In India, the Indian Intelligence 
Bureau (IB) faces little public accountability.m6 In fact, the IB, which has 
existed since 1887, might not even have any legislative basis in modern Indian 
law.m7 The Indian government has also bolstered its surveillance capabilities 
through establishing a Central Monitoring System that enables government 
interception of emails, chats, voice calls and text messages without the 
assistance of third party service providers.ms In addition, the Indian 
government has over 1.18 billion citizensm9 in its Aadhaar identification 
system based on biometric and demographic information and has disabled 
encryption between telephones and network stations, which facilitates 
government interception of communications transmissions.110 The 
10s Id. 
106 Pranesh Prakash, How Surveillance Works in India, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10 2013, 2:29 
AM), https ://india.blogs .nytimes .com/2013/07 /10 /how -surveillance-works-in-india 
(stating that "[n]o intelligence agency in India has been created under an act of 
Parliament with clearly established roles and limitations on powers, and hence there is 
no public accountability whatsoever."). 
107 See Subramanium to Katju: The Dangerous Elevation of the IB Report, FIRST POST 
(Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.firstpost.com/india/subramanium-to-katju-the-dangerous-
elevation-of-the-ib-report-1631981.html (noting that the IB is "agency established 
under an administrative order without any constitutional or statutory identity"). See 
also Explain Intelligence Bureau's Legality, HC Tells Centre, TIMES INDIA (Mar. 26, 2012), 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/Explain-Intelligence-Bureaus-legali ty-HC-
tells-Centre/ articleshow /12408605 .ems. 
108 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 98; Leo Mirani, Think US snooping is bad? Try 
Italy, India or ... Canada, QUARTZ (Jun. 10, 2013), https://qz.com/92648/think-us-
snooping-is-bad-try-italy-india-or-canada. 
109 Unique Identification Authority of India, Welcome toAADHAAR Dashboard, Gov'T 
INDIA, https://uidai.gov.in/aadhaar_dashboard (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
110 See generally Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray's No 
Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its 
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government has wide discretion in utilizing this information for national 
security and other "public interest" purposes.111 While a 1996 Supreme Court 
decision recognized that wiretapping constitutes an invasion of privacy, 112 the 
Indian government retains relatively wide discretion in collecting and 
utilizing information for national security and other "public interest" 
purposes.113 Finally, India's laws grant procedural review by a committee of 
the law enforcement official's colleagues but critics have questioned its 
procedural credibility.114 
China grants broad security powers to its security forces. As China 
scholar James Fry notes, "there are only a few legal limitations on the 
authorities when it comes to Internet surveillance, with the vast majority of 
laws providing the authorities many express powers over content 
censorship."115 The Chinese Ministry of Public Security has undertaken the 
ambitious "Police Cloud" project, which, similarly to the Indian Aadhaar, 
collects a vast amount of information tied to citizens' unique national 
identification number.116 China has also installed over 20 million cameras in 
Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2014), 
https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2437678. 
111 Rhyea Malik & Subhajit Basu, India's Dodgy Mass Surveillance Project Should 
Concern Us All, WIRED (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.wired.eo.uk/article/india-aadhaar-
biometrics-privacy; Prashant Reddy, Data Protection: Can India Overcome the Spy-
Security State and Big Tech To Enact a Strong Law?, SCROLL (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://scroll.in/article/846946/data-protection-can-india-overcome-the-spy-security-
state-and-big-tech-to-enact-a-strong-law. See also Data Protection Laws of the World: 
India, DLA PIPER (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/ 
index.html?t=law&c=IN (stating that "[t]here is no specific legislation on privacy and 
data protection in India."). 
112 See Prakash, supra note 106; Bhairav Acharya, Mastering the Art of Keeping Indians 
Under Surveillance, WIRE (May 30, 2015), https://thewire.in/2756/mastering-the-art-of-
keeping-indians-under-surveillance. 
113 See supra note 109. 
114 See Acharya, supra note 112. 
115 James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability And Internet Surveillance In The U.S. And China: 
Better The Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 419, 478 (2016), http://scholarship. 
law .upenn.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article= 1910&context=jil. 
116 China: Police 'Big Data' Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017 /11/19/china-police-big-data-
systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent. 
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the past few years as means of more closely monitoring its population.117 With 
its extensive infrastructure, China has also introduced real-time facial 
recognition tracking118 as well as voice recognition forensics for unidentified 
targets in phone conversations.119 Chinese policies have also generated less 
expectation of privacy among the Chinese public. In one recent study, only 50 
percent of Chinese consumers acknowledged the need for caution in sharing 
personal information online, and reflected a "more cavalier approach" 
towards data privacy among Chinese citizens.120 In contrast, the average 
acknowledgment of data privacy caution in ten other countries exceeded 75 
percent.121 The Washington Post reports that spying in China is so pervasive 
that government officials often spy upon one another- leading to a practice of 
hugging at the beginning of meetings in order to pat down their counterparts 
for hidden microphones.122 
China's trajectory appears to continue empowering widespread national 
security surveillance activity. China's Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) requires 
telecommunication and Internet providers within Chinese jurisdiction to 
117 Frank Langfitt, In China, Beware: A Camera May Be Watching You, NAT'LPUB. RADIO 
(Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/0l/29/170469038/in-china-beware-a-camera-
may-be-watching-you. 
118 Ms. Smith, Skynet in China: Real-life 'Person of Interest' spying in real time, CSO 
ONLINE (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3228444/security/skynet-in-
china-real-life-person-of-interest-spying-in-real-time.html. 
119 See China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 
22, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/china-voice-biometric-collection-
threatens-privacy. 
120 See George G. Chen & Tiffany G. Wong, Waiting for China's Data Protection Law, 
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 12, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/waiting-for-chinas-data-
protection-law. See also Peter Fuhrman, Government Cyber-Surveillance is the Norm in 
China-And Its Popular, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/ cyber-surveillance-is-a-w ay-of-life-in-china/2016/01/29 I e4e856dc-c47 6-11 e5-
a4aa-f25866ba0dc6 _story .html (stating that "none [of my Chinese friends] expressed 
the slightest quibble about their government knowing where they travel or when they 
receive international calls."). 
121 See Chen & Wong, supra note 120. 
122 Max Fisher, Chinese Government Officials Are Constantly Wiretapping And Spying On 
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grant data access and decryption support to government authorities under the 
ambit of national security.123 Given the government's sweeping authority to 
take "all necessary" steps to guard China's sovereignty,124 the ATL effectively 
grants access to any and all locally stored data that the Chinese government 
might want.125 Finally, an updated Intelligence Law promotes a similar 
purpose, broadly allowing Chinese security officials to "make inquiries of any 
individuals as part of their intelligence-gathering, and to examine their 
reference materials and files [and] commandeer the communications 
equipment, transportation, buildings, and other facilities of individuals as 
well as organizations and government organs."126 
In short, countries ranging from Japan, the European Union, the United 
States, India and China all display a wide array of preferences and values 
regarding their internal balance between privacy and national security 
interests. In the age of transnational data, these balances necessarily bleed 
123 Courtney M. Bowman et al., A Primer on China's New Cybersecurity Law: Privacy, 
Cross-Border Transfer Requirements, and Data Localization, PROSKAUER (May 9, 2017), 
https ://privacy law. proskauer. com/2017 /05/ articles/international/ a-primer-on-chinas-
new-cybersecuri ty-law-pri vacy-cross-border-tr ansfer-requirements-and-data-
localization (stating that decryption assistance has not included a requirement to 
surrender decryption keys); Alyssa Abkowitz & Eva Dou, Apple to Build China Data 
Center to Meet New Cybersecurity Law, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 12, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-to-build-china-data-center-to-meet-new-
cybersecurity-law-1499861507; Dante D'Orazio, China Passes Controversial Anti-
Terrorism Law To Access Encrypted User Accounts, VERGE (Dec. 27, 2015), 
https ://www. the verge. com/2015/12/27 /10670346/ china-passes-law-to-access-
encrypted-communications (stating that "[t]he new law does not require that 
companies operating in China hand over encryption keys."). 
124 This carte blanche is conferred pursuant to China's National Security Law. See 
Bowman et al., supra note 123. 
125 See D'Orazio supra note 123 ("President Obama raised his concerns over draft 
regulations with China's President Xi Jinping, saying that the rules amounted to a 
dangerous backdoor to internet services."). 
126 Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense, 
LAWFARE (Jul. 20, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-
intelligence-law-defense-offense; China Activists Fear Increased Surveillance With New 
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beyond state borders and create difficult questions for intelligence sharing 
between various agencies. The next section explores some of the barriers to 
intelligence sharing that have arisen in the face of this tradeoff. 
IV. BARRIERS TO CROSS-
BORDER INTELLIGENCE 
REGIME 
The privacy-security value disparity has led to pressure on intelligence 
sharing regimes. Most notably, the European Union has engaged in unilateral 
pressure to push states to modify their intelligence sharing practices and adopt 
greater privacy rights protections. The European Union has most actively 
imported privacy requirements onto other countries' intelligence gathering 
practices. Taking action in the name of international human rights, European 
Courts have led the effort to institute intelligence-sharing safeguards 
consistent with its interpretation of European human rights obligations. 
Europe's extraterritorial privacy governance has not been limited to national 
security practices, but has rather been part of a larger effort to govern global 
privacy law.127 As legal scholars Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu recognize, "For 
many purposes, the European Union is today the effective sovereign of global 
privacy law." 128 While European Courts have seized control of the EU' s 
127 Canada has undertaken similar efforts more recently, but its actions have not had 
the same effect. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court also ordered Google to 
erase search results worldwide associated with a regarding an accusation of 
misappropriating confidential information and trade secrets. See Google Inc. v. 
Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34, '[3, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/16701/l/document.do; see also Jacob Gershman, Judge Rules Canada Can't Make 
Google Delete Search Results in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rules-canada-cant-make-google-delete-search-
results-in-u-s-1509745395. A U.S court rejected the attempt to apply the Canadian 
ruling to U.S. jurisdiction. Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 WL 5000834, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) ("By forcing intermediaries to remove links to third-party 
material, the Canadian order ... threatens free speech on the global internet."). As one 
analyst explains, this decision suggests that countries will not succeed in 
extraterritorial enforcement in the United States. Gershman, supra. 
128 See Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless 
World, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, (2006). See also Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.5. Privacy 
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privacy exportation, many of the European Union member states would like 
to strike a different balance-especially in the intelligence sphere.129 
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
increasingly expanded its authority to review Member States' national 
security activity. In particular, the CJEU has actively policed data sharing 
practices for national security purposes, thereby influencing the security 
tradeoff for both the EU member states and also EU national security partners. 
The primary barrier of cross-border influence lies in CJEU' s commitment to 
enforcing /1 an adequate level of protection" 130 for data transfers beyond the 
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1966 (2013) ("The 
EU has played a major role in international decisions involving information privacy, a 
role that has been bolstered by the authority of EU member states to block data 
transfers to third party nations, including the United States."); Graham Greenleaf, The 
Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Implications for Globalisation 
of Convention 108, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 77 (2012) (stating, in relevant part, that 
"something reasonably described as 'European standard' data privacy laws are 
becoming the norm in most parts of the world."). 
129 Privacy watchdog Privacy International has reported inconsistencies between EU 
member state practice and CJEU decisions. For example, as of July 2017, zero EU 
member states had adjusted their data retention practices or surveillance laws into 
compliance consistent with the 2016 CJEU Watson decision. See National Data Retention 
Laws Since the C]EU's Tele-2/Watson Judgment, PRIVACY INT'L (Sept. 2017), 
https ://pri v acyinternational.org/ sites/ default/files/Data%20Retention _ 2017. pdf. 
Analysts have also noted that the UK's departure from the European Union was 
motivated at least in part by its antipathy towards the CJEU. See, e.g., Elizabeth Piper, 
Britain Outlines Plans To Break Free of European Court, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2017), 
http://www. businessinsider .com/r-bri tain-outlines-plans-to-break-free-of-european-
court-after-brexi t-2017 -8 ("The European court, or ECJ, is hated by many pro-Brexit 
lawmakers in May's governing Conservative Party, who say it has slowly sucked 
power from British courts and parliament."). While the UK currently remains a 
European Union member state, it has reiterated its position on the CJEU's limited 
jurisdiction during the introduction of its recent data protection bill. According to the 
UK government, "National security is outside the scope of EU law. Consequently, the 
processing of personal data for national security purposes is not within scope of the 
GDPR or the Law Enforcement Directive ("LED")." Home Office, Data Protection Bill: 
Factsheet-National Security Data Processing, DEP'T DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6448 
29/2017-09-13 _Factsheet04_national_security _1_.pdf. 
130 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
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EU, even when it blends into the sphere of national security. In Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner (Case C-362/14), the CJEU invalidated the transatlantic 
Safe Harbor agreement allowing for personal data sharing between European 
Union member states and the United States.131 The CJEU overruled the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner and found that in light of the Snowden 
revelations, the United States did not provide "adequate" protection to the 
personal data of E.U. citizens under the Safe Harbor framework. 132 In rejecting 
the 15-year old agreement that governed the data transfers for over 4,500 
companies,133 the CJEU pronounced that its preferred tradeoff balance must 
govern both the European Union, and the United States. The CJEU held: 
The right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the 
Charter and by the core values common to the traditions of the 
Member States, would be rendered meaningless if the State 
authorities were authorised to access electronic communications on 
a casual and generalised basis without any objective justification 
based on considerations of national security or the prevention of 
crime that are specific to the individual concerned and without those 
practices being accompanied by appropriate and verifiable 
safeguards.134 
The CJEU asserted its ability to review the validity of national security 
interests as essential to accomplishing its mission to protect other human 
rights that fell within its jurisdiction. However, as expanded upon infra, the 
CJEU operates off an implicit assumption that human rights operate 
Free Movement of Such Data, art. 45 (Jan. 25, 2012), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=EN 
[http://perma.cc/4ZY8-82A4. 
131 Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling That's Confounding Silicon Valley, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/ll/business/international/ 
behind-the-european-privacy-ruling-thats-confounding-silicon-valley.html. 
132 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2005 E.C.R. I-627, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/ docs/ application/pdf/2015-10/ cp 150117 en. pdf. 
133 Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer Pact With U.S. 
Violates Privacy, WALL STREET J., (Oct. 6, 2015 1:42 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/eu-court-strikes-down-trans-atlantic-safe-harbor-data-transfer-pact-
1444121361. 
134 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. I-31-32. 
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unilaterally in the privacy security tradeoff.135 It also assumes the CJEU' s right 
to give precedence to the CJEU' s preferred balance point vis-a-vis other 
sovereign states. This assumption seemingly contradicts the CJEU' s explicit 
finding that 
In a democratic society, a balance must be struck between these 
competing concerns, interests and values. Not every State will strike 
the same balance. One will place a greater emphasis on the right to 
privacy and one will place a greater emphasis on the requirements 
of national security. It is important to state that it is not the function of 
this court to assess, still less resolve, the relative merits of these positions.136 
In light of the CJEU' s stated position on the limited roles of the courts, the 
Court's decision was quite remarkable. Nevertheless, CJEU's resolution of 
"the relative merits of these [privacy tradeoff] positions" has created tensions 
with the privacy-security balances employed in other states' intelligence 
practices. 
In addition to direct judicial review of national security data sharing 
arrangements, the European Union has also conditioned cross-border data 
sharing on its review of, among other factors, a non-EU country's national 
security practices.137 Thus far, Andorra, Argentina, the Faroe Islands, 
Guernsey, Israel, the Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland and 
Uruguay have received adequacy decisions, 138 and both Canada and the 
135 See discussion infra Part IV. 
136 Case 2016 No. 4809 P., Data Prot. Comm'r v. Facebook Ireland Limited & 
Maximillian Schrems, §47 (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/ 
HCJ.pdf (emphasis added). 
137 See Resolution of 6 April 2017 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, EUR. P ARL. Doc. 2016/3018 'II 20 (RSP), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP //NONSGML + T A+P8-
T A-2017-0131 +0+DOC +PDF+ VO//EN. Interview with Iain Bourne, Group Manager -
Parliamentary and Government Affairs Department, United Kingdom Information 
Commissioner's Office (Aug. 1, 2017) (notes on file with author). 
138 European Union Comm.: 3rd Report of Session 2017-19, Brexit: The EU Data 
Protection Package, HOUSE OF LORDS §67 (2017) https://publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/7 /7.pdf; see also Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data 
in non-EU Countries, EUROPEAN COMM., https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-
fundamental-rights/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-
personal-data-non-eu-countries_en; HM Gov'T, supra note 65, at 'II 37. 
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United States have received "partial" adequacy decisions. 139 By leveraging the 
stick of forbidding corporate-to-corporate cross-border information sharing, 
the CJEU has been able to exercise a powerful de facto influence on U.S. 
intelligence practices, and a significant barrier to intelligence sharing to the 
extent that the U.S. refuses to amend its practices.140 As one European legal 
scholar described this success, "It is no exaggeration to state that in future, 
transnational privacy law will not be written in Brussels, but in in 
Luxembourg." 141 For example, in order to achieve the new US-EU Privacy 
Shield agreement, the United States has assigned a State Department official 
to serve as an Ombudsperson charged with the role of serving as the point of 
contact for foreign governments to raise concerns regarding US signals 
intelligence activities.142 The Ombudsperson also collaborates with 
independent oversight bodies in the US government like the Inspectors 
139 Canada has a partial adequacy with respect to only commercial organizations 
subject to the PIPED Act, and the United States has an adequacy decision for 
organizations certified under the Privacy Shield only. Id. 
140 Alexander Garrelfs, GDPR Top Ten: #3 Extraterritorial Applicability Of The GDPR, 
DELOITTE, Apr. 3, 2017, https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/risk/articles/gdpr-top-
ten-3-extraterritorial-applicability-of-the-gdpr.html. Even if one were to contest that 
the regulations only apply to those operating in EU jurisdiction negate the 
extraterritorial reach, the de facto extraterritorial imposition still applies. See, e.g., 
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 78 (2000) ("Most 
importantly, once U.S. businesses adopt internal data privacy policies to avoid EU 
transfer restrictions, they subject themselves to potential FTC enforcement proceedings 
for failure to comply with proclaimed policies. In any case, it will be pragmatically 
difficult for businesses to employ two sets of data privacy practices, one for EU 
residents (providing for greater privacy protection) and one for U.S. residents 
(providing for less."). Thomas Wischmeyer, Faraway, So Close!' - A Constitutional 
Perspective on Transatlantic Data Flow Regulation, in OBAMA'S COURT: RECENT CHANGES 
IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE (Anna-Bettina Kaiser, 
Niels Petersen & Johannes Saurer eds.) 14 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877548 
("Moreover, the CJEU' s strict scrutiny standard from Schrems coupled with the 
extraterritorial scope of EU privacy law established in Google Spain amount to a de-
facto implementation of EU law on non-EU actors, in particular private actors based in 
the U.S."). 
141 Wischmeyer, supra note 140. 
142 EU - U.S. Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://www.state.gov/ 
e/privacyshield/ombud. 
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General to ensure that appropriate safeguards and procedures are in place.143 
This Privacy Shield, a creature of compromise,144 is now under attack as 
privacy activists hope to use litigation to further heighten U.S. intelligence 
safeguards.145 As illustrated through the Privacy Shield example, European 
judicial oversight poses the challenge of holding foreign government 
intelligence agencies to a privacy-security tradeoff different than the one that 
they have traditionally chosen.146 
However, the United States is not entirely blameless in this regard. The 
CJEU Schrems decision responded to the United States' jurisprudence on the 
Fourth Amendment's inapplicability to non-U.S. citizens located outside of 
United States territory.147 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the 
Fourth Amendment does not "restrain the actions of the Federal Government 
against aliens outside of the United States territory." 148 In other words, when 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.5. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1967 (2013) (arguing that privacy "policymaking has 
not been led exclusively by the EU, but has been a collaborative effort marked by 
accommodation and compromise."); Maria Tzanou, The War against Terror and 
Transatlantic Information Sharing: Spillovers of Privacy or Spillovers of Security, 31 UTRECHT 
J. INT'L & EUR. L. 87 (2015) (arguing that EU-US privacy agreement might not actually 
have the privacy forcing effect on the United States that many analysts suggest). 
145 Second Legal Challenge Launched Against "Privacy Shield", ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CENTER, Nov. 3, 2016, https://epic.org/2016/11/second-legal-challenge-launche.html. 
146 However, these changes in privacy-security balance may have thus far been 
mostly cosmetic. Maria Tzanou's assessment of EU data sharing agreements with the 
U.S. suggest that in practice, the United States has drawn the EU towards the security 
end of the privacy-security tradeoff without conceding any security powers. Tzanou, 
supra note 144, at 95 ("While potential 'spillovers of privacy' are not visible yet, 
'spillovers of security' looking in the opposite direction, are certainly here."). 
147 See generally Wischmeyer, supra note 140, at 4. 
148 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). One must however 
note the irony that the justification for the decision rested in part on a need for 
international comity: "For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in 
which our Government must be able to "functio[n] effectively in the company of 
sovereign nations." ... Some who violate our laws may live outside our borders under 
a regime quite different from that which obtains in this country. Situations threatening 
to important American interests may arise half-way around the globe, situations which 
... [require cooperation] through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation." Id. 
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it comes to foreign nationals located abroad, the United States' privacy-
security tradeoff determines that for intelligence purposes, foreigners do not 
receive any privacy protection. This lack of constitutional procedural 
protection has culminated in foreign opposition to United States' Upstream 
surveillance practices authorized under Section 702 of the FISA Amendment 
Act of 2008.149 The Amendment eliminated the previous statutory warrant and 
probable cause requirements for the collection of electronic communication by 
non-United States persons located extraterritorially.150 The § 702 standard 
requires joint authorization by the Attorney General and the Director of the 
National Intelligence with a showing that the targets are "reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information."151 The Upstream collection physically taps the fiber-optic cables 
responsible for data traffic, and enables bulk communication interception.152 
at 275. See also Wischmeyer, supra note 140, at 7 (discussing Verdugo-Urquidez effects); 
see discussion supra note 96 (detailing recent §702 jurisprudence). 
149 Daskal, supra note 62, at 346. 
150 Id. In contrast, the Act retains explicit due process safeguards for United States 
citizens. See Matt Olsen, "Fixes" to Surveillance Law Could Severely Harm FBI National 
Security Investigations, JUST SEC. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/47349/ 
section-702-privacy-surveillance-law-severely-harm-fbi-national-security-
investigations. However, there are still concerns of incidental collection of U.S. 
persons' communications. See Elizabeth Goitein, Closing Section 702 's Front-Door Search 
Loophole: A Critical Protection for Americans, JUST SEC. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/ 46239 I closing-section-702s-front-door-search-loophole-
cri tical-protection-americans. Additionally, the Open Technology Institute has 
carefully documented the public record of FISA Section 702 compliance violations. 
Robyn Greene, A History of FISA Section 702 Compliance Violations, NEW AM.: OPEN 
TECH. INST. (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/history-fisa-section-
702-compliance-violations/#. But see PRIVACY & CL. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-
Report.pdf (providing, in relevant part, that "[o]peration of the Section 702 program 
has been subject to judicial oversight and extensive internal supervision, and the Board 
has found no evidence of intentional abuse."). 
151 Daskal, supra note 62, at 346. 
152 Scarlet Kim, How Bulk Interception Works, PRIVACY INT'L (Sep. 30, 2016), 
https://medium.com/privacy-international/how-bulk-interception-works-
d645440ff6bd; see also Daskal, supra note 62, at 349 ("Whereas collection through the 
PRISM program is done with the assistance of the ISP or phone service providers with 
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While in the past, Upstream collection included "to, from or about" 
information about a Section 702 Selector, beginning in May 2017, the Upstream 
collection only intercepted "to or from" communication data. 153 This 
interception capability takes advantage of the United States' domestic access 
control over Internet infrastructure, 154 and may set a precedential model for 
other states to engage in similar fiber-optics tapping practices.155 Of note, 
despite the CJEU' s condemnation of U.S. intelligence gathering practices, it is 
not clear that European governments provide greater safeguards against 
foreign government surveillance.156 Other practices notwithstanding, the 
balance struck by U.S. government surveillance plays an outsized role given 
the effective control that U.S. companies exert over vast swaths of the 
lnternet.157 When the United States intelligence agencies need information, 
whom the target interacts, "upstream" collection is done with the assistance of the 
Internet and telecommunications companies that control the fiber-optic cables over 
which a target's communications travel."); Ashley Gorski & Patrick Toomey, 
Unprecedented and Unlawful: The NSA's 'Upstream' Surveillance, AM. CL. UNION (Sep. 
23, 2016 ), https://www .aclu.org/blog/national-security /privacy-and-surveillance/ 
unprecedented-and-unlawful-nsas-upstream (describing Upstream and accompany-
ing concerns). 
153 NSA Stops Certain Section 702 "Upstream" Activities, NAT'L SEC. AGENCY: CENTRAL 
SEC. SERV., Apr. 28, 2017, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/ 
2017-04-28-702-statement.shtml. 
154 See Kim, supra note 152 ("The geographic location of the US features a high 
concentration of cables emanating from its east and west coasts."); Ian Brown, The 
Feasibility Of Transatlantic Privacy-Protective Standards For Surveillance, 23 INT'L J. L. & 
INFO. TECH. 23, 29 (2014), https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/article/23/1/23/2907405 ("USA 
is reluctant to accept limitations on its abilities to monitor data and communications 
relating to non-US persons that physically transit US territory-which NSA Director 
Keith Alexander has called a huge 'home-field advantage'."). 
155 See Daskal, supra note 50, at 474 ("The approach taken by the United States is likely 
to become a model for others, thus providing the United States a unique opportunity 
to set the standards."). 
156 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 250; see also Deeks, supra note 51, at 332 (detailing 
bulk collection practices in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and France). 
157 Daskal, supra note 50, at 47 4 ("While the problem of cross-border access to data is 
inherently international, the United States has an outsized role to play, given a 
combination of the U.S.-based provider dominance of the market"); Rubinstein et al., 
supra note 30, at 118 (stating, in relevant part, that "[t]he USA is perceived as having 
unique advantages in [transborder surveillance]."). 
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they can (with the appropriate domestic safeguards) utilize the information in 
question. As viewed by non-Americans, U.S. hegemony over Internet services 
allows for intrusions by the United States government, irrespective of 
domestic national privacy protections.158 While the United States has stated 
that it is undeterred by the possible consequences of its unchecked § 702 
collection,159 in practice, the US has taken steps to regulate its collection of 
foreign intelligence to account for privacy interests of those located abroad. 160 
158 See, e.g., Brief for Appellate at 8, In the Matter of A Warrant To Search A Certain 
E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained By Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft Corp. 
v. United States (2014) (No. 14-2985-cv.), 2014 WL 7277561, at *8 ("European citizens 
are highly sensitive to the differences between European and U.S. standards on data 
protection. Such concerns are frequently raised in relation to the regulation of cross-
border data flows and the mass-processing of data by U.S. technology companies. The 
successful execution of the warrant at issue in this case would extend the scope of this 
anxiety to a sizeable majority of the data held in the world's datacenters outside the 
U.S. (most of which are controlled by U.S. corporations) and would thus undermine 
the protections of the EU data protection regime, even for data belonging to an EU 
citizen and stored in an EU country."). See also Farhad Manjoo, Why The World Is 
Drawing Battle Lines Against American Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/technology/why-the-world-is-drawing-battle-
lines-against-american-tech-giants.html; Internet Firms Face A Global Techlash, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/international/21726072-
though-big-tech-firms-are-thriving-they-are-facing-more-scrutiny-ever-internet-firms 
("Some governments are unsettled by the growing role in their national lives of firms 
whose values are distinctively American, in particular in their commitment to free 
speech ahead of privacy."). 
159 Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the 
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1130 (2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2017 /04/69-Stan-L-Rev-1075.pdf ("[T]he [U.S. Department of 
Justice] has made it clear that it intends to use hacking techniques for all crimes, 
regardless of the potential cross-border implications."). In late 2017 and early 2018, § 
702 underwent a heated reauthorization debate in the USA Liberty Act. See, e.g., Olsen, 
supra note 150 (defending "national security imperative" for full reauthorization). In 
January 2018, Congress reauthorized FISA Section 702 for another six years. Ted 
Barrett & Ashley Killough, Senate Passed FISA Section 702 Reauthorization, CNN (Jan. 18, 
2018 ), https ://www.mn.com/2018/01/18/poli tics/fisa-reau thorization-senate-vote. 
160 President Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 added additional safeguards 
for non-U.S. citizens located abroad and required that "signals intelligence activities 
must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect[.]" 
See PPD-28, supra note 96. But see Eric Manpearl, The Privacy Rights of Non-U.S. Persons 
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In short, the European Courts have taken steps to govern the intelligence 
sharing practices of not only the European Union Member States, but also their 
intelligence partners. This jurisprudence catches other states in a bind; states 
have their historical privacy-security tradeoff on one hand, and a legitimate 
need to engage in intelligence sharing with EU member states as well. 
Moreover, the United States' lack of extraterritorial privacy protection has 
further aggravated these barriers to intelligence sharing. The United States' 
legal stance, that the privacy-security considerations grant no privacy 
protections to foreigners located abroad, has generated understandable 
discomfort among partnering countries. In particular, foreign onlookers fear 
that the dissonance between domestic and foreign surveillance protections can 
facilitate a "revolving door" method by which their own intelligence services 
may partner with the United States to circumvent national limitations on 
domestic surveillance.161 
The EU Court's approach to intelligence governance leads the EU to strike 
a particular privacy-security tradeoff for cross-border intelligence sharing. 
Privacy rights do not dissolve in the face of security; as the famous quote 
attributed to Benjamin Franklin goes, "Those who would give up essential 
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor 
Safety."162 However, the human rights interests weigh on both sides of the 
scale-too much privacy jeopardizes the human right to life and security. The 
European Courts have approached intelligence sharing with a privacy 
idealism that has infused their jurisprudence, but has met practical resistance 
by security apparatuses, including within EU member states.163 Unless 
in Signals Intelligence, 29 FL. J. INT'L L. 303 (2017) https://heinonline.org/ 
HOL/P?h=hein.journals/fjil29&i=323 (arguing that "the United States should rescind 
PPD-28's expansion of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons because of its cost to 
U.S. intelligence capabilities, which are critical to protecting U.S. national security 
interests, the American people, and the U.S. Homeland."). 
161 See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 8. 
162 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, in VOTES AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1755-1756 (1756), 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=6&page=238a. 
163 See, e.g., Lorna Woods, Transferring Personal Data Outside the EU: Clarification from 
the EC]?, EU L. ANALYSIS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/08/ 
transferring-personal-data-outside-eu.html; New Privacy International report shows that 
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European law enforcement and intelligence partners comport with the 
requisite privacy data collection and data sharing standards, Europe may not 
be able to lawfully access or utilize the proffered foreign intelligence. As such, 
this standard has the potential to undermine Europe's effectiveness in 
receiving foreign information. It also undermines the national security of 
European partners who may no longer have the ability to share European 
intelligence.164 Below, this Article tackles the challenge of designing criteria 
by which states may share intelligence with agencies that may strike a 
different privacy balance yet still ensuring the legitimate safeguarding of 
privacy interests. 
V. ADOPTING CRITERIA FOR 
GOVERNMENT 
INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
A. International Law Governing Intelligence Sharing 
As Professor Ashley Deeks recognizes, when it comes to international law and 
the intelligence landscape, "few guideposts exist on how to proceed." 165 
Professor Michael Reisman and James Baker have suggested that "the legality 
of any proactive covert operation should be tested by whether it promotes the 
basic policy objectives of the Charter, for example, self-determination; 
whether it adds to or detracts from minimum world order; whether it is 
consistent with contingencies authorizing the overt use of force; and whether 
covert coercion was implemented only after plausibly less coercive measures 
21 European countries are unlawfully retaining personal data, PRIVACY INT'L (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-release/52/new-pri vacy-international-
report-shows-21-european-countries-are-unlawfully; Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 253 
(noting that the European Council of Ministers have spent years resisting "efforts to 
put EU privacy-protective legislation on a firmer footing."). 
164 Assuming that leaving the threat to national security unchecked is not a viable 
option, then the absence of foreign intelligence sharing will likely lead to increased 
surveillance of foreigners by European governments. 
165 Deeks, supra note 63, at 667. See also BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 70 (stating that 
"relatively few countries have legislation on strategic surveillance and the 
jurisprudence of international courts is sparse."). 
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were tried."166 Reisman and Baker's operational approach, while practically 
oriented, has received criticism for granting almost "unfettered discretion" to 
the state analyzing the issue.167 
Some legal scholars have sought to find an international human right to 
privacy in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
an international treaty with 169 parties.168 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires: 
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status." 169 However, the United States 
has consistently taken the position that the ICCPR does not apply 
extraterritorially,170 and state practice demonstrates "few, if any" 
extraterritorial privacy protections against intelligence surveillance.171 As 
Asaf Lubin notes: "Despite this prevalent state practice, U.N. experts, human 
rights treaty bodies, and privacy NGOs have been adamant about protecting 
the myth of a singular and universal right to privacy. By doing so, they seem 
to 'abet the deception, avoiding the truth like someone pulling blankets over 
his head to avoid the cold reality of dawn."' 172 Other scholars have identified 
166 W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, 
CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
AMERICAN LAW 26-27 (1992). 
167 Deeks, supra note 63, at 668. 
168 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/03/19760323%2006-
17%20AM/Ch_IV _04.pdf. 
169 Id. at art. 2, 'II 1. 
170 See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg., 'II 20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995) (statement of Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Dep't of State) ("The Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application . 
. . . During the negotiating history, the words 'within its territory' had been debated 
and were added by vote, with the clear understanding that such wording would limit 
the obligations to within a Party's territory."). 
171 Lubin, supra note 51, at 551. 
172 Id. at 515 (citing W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE 
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 229, 237 (1977)). To take a few recent examples, see, e.g., ANA 
VANESSA MIRANDA ANTUNES DA SILVA, ENHANCING SURVEILLANCE THROUGH THE 
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that even if one accepts that the ICCPR has extraterritorial effect, Article 17 of 
the ICCPR does not create an absolute limitation on intrusion, but rather only 
forbids "arbitrary or unlawful interference."173 As a result, despite the ardent 
advocacy, most scholars agree that as a practical matter, United States 
opposition and state practice do not provide a viable implementation of 
universal privacy rights on the basis of the ICCPR.174 
PATRIOT ACT AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENT ACT, AND 
THEIR IMP ACT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES: CAN HUMAN SECURITY BE COMPROMISED BY 
SECURITIZATION? 138 (2014), https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/ 
33875/l/ Ana%20Vanessa%20Miranda%20Antunes%20da%20Silva.pdf ("[T]here is an 
increasing perception, not only but particularly in the EU, that the international human 
rights law applies extraterritorially and should be respected in order to abide by these 
international obligations."); Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 1 ("[Privacy] is a 
fundamental right enjoyed by all members of the human community and deserving of 
respect by all states whenever they act on their territory or enjoy "effective control" 
over persons."); Eliza Watt, The Right To Privacy And The Future Of Mass Surveillance, 21 
INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 773, 776 (2017) ("Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply 
extraterritorially, which means that states must respect the right to privacy whenever 
individuals are within their territory as well as their jurisdiction."). The U.N. General 
Assembly also adopted consensus resolution, G.A. Res. 68/167, 'II 3 (Dec. 18, 2013), 
which "[a]ffirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected 
online, including the right to privacy." However, the U.S., which joined the resolution, 
issued an explanation reiterating that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially. U.S. 
Envoy at U.N., Explanation of Position on Draft Resolution L.26/Rev. 1 The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age (Nov. 25, 2014) (cited in Deeks, supra note 51, at 334). 
173 ICCPR, supra note 168, at art. 17. See also Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 6 ("The 
wording of Article 17 of the ICCPR makes clear that privacy is only protected against 
"unlawful" and "arbitrary" interferences."); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global 
Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2137, 2138 (2014), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=4980&context=flr ("This Article takes a middle ground that acknowledges that 
the United States has an extraterritorial duty under Article 2(1) to "respect" ICCPR 
rights including privacy, but then construes Article 17's prohibition on arbitrary 
interference narrowly to permit NSA surveillance abroad, given the legal constraints 
already in place governing the NSA's efforts."); Deeks, supra note 51, at 307 ("The 
Commentary to the ICCPR does indicate, however, that when states were negotiating 
Article 17, they understood the prohibition on "unlawful" or "arbitrary" interference 
to refer to acts that conflicted with the state's domestic legal system (which tends to 
run with the state's territory)."). 
174 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 254 ("For these reasons, privacy advocates are 
right not to place all hopes on the broad jurisprudence of international human rights.") 
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International law governing state sovereignty might also seem to prevent 
foreign intelligence collection and its subsequent sharing. As Bert-Jaaps Koop 
and Morag Goodwin contend, 
In the strict-and still dominant-interpretation of international 
law, any evidence-gathering activity in a foreign state, including the 
making of a mere phone call, can be considered a breach of state 
sovereignty. Accessing data that is, or later turns out to be, stored 
on a server located in the territory of another state, without the prior 
consent of that state, constitutes a breach of the territorial integrity 
of that state and thus a wrongful act.175 
In other words, according to Koop and Goodwin, non-consensual intelligence 
gathering violates the international legal principle of state territorial integrity. 
The authors point to Article 19 of the Cybercrime Convention, which provides 
that extended computer network searches should not cross national borders 
in the absence of two circumstances outlined in Article 32: a) lawful and 
voluntary consent from foreign actors, or b) if the targeted information is 
publicly available.176 If states violated international law in collecting shared 
intelligence, then one might consider international law to forbid any 
subsequent use of the information. 
Koops and Goodwin's point notwithstanding, further case law developed 
by the rights-protective European Court of Human Rights may have cabined 
the effect of international law limitations for cross-border computer searches. 
In Weber and Saravia v. Germany, the Plaintiffs charged Germany's Federal 
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) with the interception of 
telecommunications and the subsequent use of personal data. 177 The Court 
took important notice of the fact that while the data may have been relayed 
from foreign countries, the devices used to monitor the wireless 
175 Koops & Goodwin, supra note 32, at 9. 
176 Id. at 53 (citing Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. 185). A similar 
provision is included in article 40 of the League of Arab States' Arab Convention on 
Combating Information Technology Offences (available at https://cms.unov.org/ 
DocumentReposi tory Indexer/GetDodnOriginalF ormat. drsx ?DocID=3dbe778b-7b3a-
4af0-95ce-a8bbd 1 ecd6dd ). 
177 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173, 
Admissibility (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/ content/pdf/001-76586. 
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communications were situated in sovereign German territory. 178 In doing so, 
the Court held that this German interception did not constitute conduct 
"which interfered with the territorial sovereignty of foreign States as protected 
in public international law." 179 Under parallel reasoning, a state would not 
interfere with the territorial sovereignty of any foreign state as long as that 
state accessed the wireless Internet data from a computer located in its own 
country. Additionally, in contrast to criminal evidence collection, foreign 
intelligence gathering constitutes acts of espionage. When it comes to 
espionage, 
one can identify scores of sources in international law to establish the 
existence of the ]us Ad Explorationem (the Right to Spy). So much so, 
in fact, that "to claim that espionage is not a priori permissible as a 
sovereign prerogative is simply inconceivable in our public world 
order" and certainly in discontent with both vast bodies law and 
practice.180 
As such, state sovereignty does not provide a barrier to intelligence gathering 
under international law. Therefore, the subsequent intelligence sharing does 
not constitute 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' 
Finally, at least one court-the European Court of Human Rights-has 
tied the international law principles governing surveillance and intelligence 
gathering to intelligence sharing. In Liberty v UK, the ECtHR held that the 
privacy safeguards on intelligence data must detail the "procedure to be 
followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying 
intercepted material."181 In the absence of conflicting jurisprudence, the 
ECtHR case law makes a plausible contention that any international law 
178 Id. at 'II 86 ("The Court observes that the impugned provisions of the amended G 
10 Act authorise the monitoring of international wireless telecommunications, that is, 
telecommunications which are not effected via fixed telephone lines but, for example, 
via satellite or radio relay links, and the use of data thus obtained. Signals emitted 
from foreign countries are monitored by interception sites situated on German soil and 
the data collected are used in Germany."). 
179 Id. 
180 Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ 
Surveillance Conundrum, 57 WASHBURN L. J. 17, 56 (2018). 
181 Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (July 1, 
2008), § 69, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-87207 (emphasis added). 
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governing intelligence collection mandates some privacy consideration in 
intra-governmental intelligence sharing. 
B. Scholarship on Intelligence Governance Frameworks 
The legal field has proliferated substantial writing on international 
intelligence bodies and covert operations, but far less attention has been paid 
to intelligence sharing. Some of the classic literature recognizes the 
importance of data sharing but does not address the challenges arising from 
various privacy regimes. For example, work by Professors Myres McDougal, 
Harold Lasswell and Michael Reisman note the importance of intelligence 
sharing across governments: "The model of Interpol may be simulated by 
'lnterspy,' a service that draws upon the sources available to all organizations 
willing and able to work together to expose threats to world public order."182 
While McDougal et al recognize the importance of intelligence sharing,183 they 
do not address the differences in privacy-security balances.184 Over the past 
few decades, with what Professor Margo Schlanger has recognized a rise of 
"intelligence legalism," legal scholarship has taken a renewed interest 
between law and the intelligence community.185 Much of the effort has 
focused on MLAT reform, which grapples with the more circumscribed 
problem of obstruction in law enforcement data sharing requests.186 Other 
182 McDougal et al., supra note 44, at 447. 
183 Id. at 422 ("As global interdependence increases, this imbalance will ultimately 
prove to be detrimental to planning on the part of even the most developed 
communities, and will give greater impetus to the sharing of processing technology."). 
184 Id. 
185 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil 
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 112, 113 (2015). 
186 See Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Keane Woods, Cross-Border Data Requests: A 
Proposed Framework, LAWFARE (Nov. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
cross-border-data-requests-proposed-framework; see also Daskal, supra note 50; Daskal, 
supra note 62, at 393 ("these concerns highlight the need for new cross-border 
mechanisms that facilitate law enforcement access to data, yet also respect the 
sovereign interest in setting privacy protections and controlling law enforcement 
operations within one's jurisdiction."); ANDREW K. WOODS, DATA BEYOND BORDERS: 
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE (2015), 
https :// globalnetworkini tiati ve .org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GNI-MLAT-
Report. pdf; MICHAEL CHERTOFF & PAUL ROSENZWEIG, A PRIMER ON GLOBALLY 
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proposals tackle "government data collection" with a broad scope and do not 
clarify whether they intend their proposals to address the MLAT process or 
also include government intelligence sharing.187 
Inter-governmental data-sharing regimes have been woefully under-
theorized by the legal literature.188 Nearly all the work focuses on domestic 
privacy governance over the home regime and does not seriously engage with 
the question of harmonizing the different privacy-security tradeoffs for 
intelligence sharing between allied governments. Instead, the goal is to 
regulate the surveillance practices of each country, so a uniform sharing 
HARMONIZING INTERNET JURISDICTION AND REGULATIONS (Global Comm'n on Internet 
Gov., Paper No. 10 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper 
_nolO_O.pdf; Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System 
for Mutual Legal Assistance, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO 
PRIVATE-SECTOR DATA (Fred H. Cate & James X. Dempsey eds., 2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2696163; Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLA T 
Reform for the Digital Age, HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-al ternati ves-mlat-reform-for-the-digi tal-
age; Gail Kent, Sharing Investigation Specific Data with Law Enforcement-An 
International Approach (Feb. 14, 2014) (Stanford Pub. L. working paper), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472413. For a useful overview of the current status of UK-
UK MLAT negotiations as well as some of the remaining concerns, see Tiffany Lin & 
Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K. 
Agreement (Berkman Klein Center Research Pub. No. 2017-7, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3035563. 
187 See, e.g., Microsoft Corporate Blog, Time For An International Convention On 
Government Access To Data, MICROSOFT (Jan. 20, 2014), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-
the-issues/2014/01/20/time-for-an-international-convention-on-government-access-to-
data (writing generally about "government access to data"). However, given 
Microsoft's well-documented challenges navigating conflicts over compelled data 
disclosures, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-microsoft-corp, one may 
reasonably assume that the Microsoft's principle concern centers on government access 
to data stored by private companies, not exchanged with foreign intelligence agencies. 
188 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 105 ("Although most of the countries appear to 
consider multinational access and sharing essential to national security and law 
enforcement activities, these arrangements received relatively little attention in the 
papers that were commissioned. Overall, it seems, there has been relatively little 
discussion of the complex legal and political issues associated with asserting 
jurisdiction over data stored in other countries or relating to citizens of other 
countries."). 
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standard is often assumed. Professor Peter Margulies' article presents an 
exception to this rule; while Margulies does not consider intelligence sharing, 
he envisions complementarity providing procedural pluralism to legitimate 
differing state surveillance practices under international law.189 More typical 
is the stance epitomized by Edward Snowden supporters, who have clamored 
for the introduction of a "Snowden Treaty," which calls to outlaw mass 
surveillance and create whistleblower protections.190 
Some scholars and human rights groups have sought to forge limiting 
principles conjured from international human rights law. Rubinstein et al have 
sought to design a privacy framework directly based on the principles 
governing surveillance (for law enforcement and intelligence gathering) 
extrapolated from the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, 191 and 
suggest fourteen principles from the ECtHR.192 However, the Rubinstein 
analysis does not directly consider intelligence sharing with foreign 
governments. Similarly, privacy activist group Necessary & Proportionate 
has outlined thirteen principles that they believe provide the international 
human rights law standards for government communications surveillance.193 
While at first blush, one of the principles, safeguards for international 
cooperation, seems to cover the subject of this inquiry-intelligence sharing, 
it entirely elides the issue. The principle discusses international cooperation 
within the context of MLATs. MLATs are used only for criminal 
189 Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157 ("A state could choose from a number of 
procedural options that would accomplish these goals, without being locked into 
specific measures that might not fit with that state's history or traditions. Procedural 
pluralism would also minimize conflicts with other international rules, such as the law 
of armed conflict and Security Council resolutions mandating counterterrorism 
efforts."). 
190 What is the Snowden Treaty, SNOWDEN TREATY, http://www.snowdentreaty.org; The 
Snowden Treaty: A new International Treaty on the Right to Privacy, Protection Against 
Improper Surveillance and Protection of Whistleblowers, SNOWDEN TREATY, 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/fb845b_89e20fe385844f348fbc79a6ede39a4d.pdf. 
191 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 111. 
192 Id. 
193 Necessary and Proportionate: International Principles On The Application Of Human 
Rights To Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE COALITION (May 
2014), https://necessaryandproportionate.org/principles. 
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investigations, and do not cover intelligence sharing.194 It is possible that 
Necessary & Proportionate have implicitly adopted the position that 
intelligence sharing should fall within the MLAT framework, although this 
delivers a strained reading given MLATs' traditional scope. Finally, President 
Obama' s Presidential Policy Directive 28 establishing voluntary minimum 
protections for foreigners during government intelligence activities has 
introduced another helpful framework, as the protections outlined in PPD-28 
benefited from the insight of the real security needs that government 
intelligence seeks to address.195 However, the PPD-28 framework is 
incomplete, both in its lack of legal discussion and lack of detail. 
The few works that do directly consider inter-governmental intelligence 
sharing almost unfailingly adopt a tunnel vision towards only the "privacy" 
elements of the privacy-security tradeoff.196 Take, for example, Eliza Watt's 
effort supporting the proposed Intelligence Codex for the Council of Europe.197 
David Cole and Federico Fabbrini argue for a comprehensive transatlantic 
privacy between the EU and US that would close the protection gap endemic 
in the lack of extraterritorial privacy protection under each jurisdiction.198 Ian 
Brown et al undertakes the project to outline "privacy-conscious intelligence 
reform," and proposes a series of standards, but do not actually consider 
194 Greg Nojeim, MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 
(Sep. 3, 2015), https://cdt.org/insight/mlat-reform-a-straw-man-proposal. 
195 PPD-28, supra note 96 (committing to 1) proportionality, 2) use, dissemination, and 
retention limitations 3) data security and accuracy protections 4) oversight 
procedures.). 
196 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 253 ("[T]he international law scholarship, even on 
its own terms, is often incomplete, because much of it is framed in terms applicable 
only to ordinary law enforcement, without taking on board the extra flexibility and 
secrecy that is arguably "necessary in a democratic society" in the case of surveillance 
for national security purposes."). 
197 Watt, supra note 172, at 784 ("There can be no doubt that a binding treaty, such as 
the proposed Codex, is necessary."). The Council of Europe suggested four principles 
to govern intra-European intelligence cooperation: 1) prohibition on mutual political 
and economic espionage; 2) foreign intelligence activity must receive ex ante approval 
from the target state; 3) prohibition on tracking, analyzing, or storing data without 
individualized suspicion from a friendly state, and 4) prohibition on compelled 
disclosures from telecommunication and internet companies without a court order. Id. 
19s Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 30, at 223. 
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intelligence-sharing.199 Privacy International' s recent call for greater 
transparency over government intelligence sharing reflects the renewed 
interest in bringing law into the shadowy sphere of government intelligence, 
but the privacy advocacy group does not suggest a framework for intelligence 
governance beyond public transparency. 200 
Professor Stephen Schulhofer rejects "the developing consensus" that a 
comprehensive multilateral agreement to abide by surveillance principles or 
minimum standards would help regulate expansive state surveillance 
activity.201 Instead, Schulhofer argues that a "privacy-conscious international 
framework" would allow "the fox to design th[ e] henhouse," and his "ultimate 
concern [] for privacy and democracy worldwide" leads him to reject an 
agreement that would almost inevitably lead to an arrangement at less than 
maximal privacy.202 Instead, Schulhofer promotes bilateral commitment in 
which each party grants whichever safeguards it observes when engaging in 
surveillance over its own citizens. 203 
Schulhofer is right. A multinational arrangement would necessarily result 
in less privacy safeguards than required for national security activity in the 
maximally protective states. But from here we differ. Unlike Schulhofer, I 
reject the premise that privacy rights are the only rights at play here and 
199 Ian Brown et al., Towards Multilateral Standards for Surveillance Reform (Jan. 5, 
2015) (Oxford Internet Institute Discussion Paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551164 
(outlining standards of 1) legitimate national security purposes for surveillance, 2) 
establishment of extraterritorial privacy standards, 3) tailored limitations on data 
collection beyond a broad "relevant to national security interest," 4) minimization 
standards, 5) methods of oversight, 6) protection against unauthorized access.). Their 
closest standard is "onward transmission/purpose limitation," but this limitation refers 
to alternative non-intelligence uses, not sharing with another intelligence agency. See 
id. at 5-6. The paper also provides an excellent recap of some of the existing intelligence 
reform proposals. Id. at 20-24. 
200 Privacy International Launches International Campaign For Greater Transparency 




201See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 242. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 261. 
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contend that security considerations also implicate human rights in a way that 
justifies tailored departures for intelligence-sharing purposes. Security 
officials are not the "fox in the henhouse," but rather serious stakeholders in a 
privacy-security duet balancing competing human rights. 
Ashley Deeks and Peter Margulies are possibly the only scholars who 
have employed a true balance-oriented approach in designing an intelligence-
sharing framework. 204 However, both works only treat intelligence sharing as 
an incidental measure to a state's domestic intelligence program. Deeks 
recognizes that "[there is no] disagreement that the right to privacy is a 
qualified right, subject to lawful and non-arbitrary interference by a state." 205 
Instead, she suggests six "procedural norms" that would create meaningful 
privacy protections without harming national security. 206 Deeks touches 
briefly on intelligence sharing by recognizing that a preference for domestic 
surveillance would help address the "revolving door" concern, and notes that 
such a principle /1 could increase the need for ongoing coordination among 
allies' intelligence agencies." 207 Similarly, Margulies offers a list of procedural 
protections.208 Like Deeks, Margulies recognizes that harmonizing standards 
"could also remove any barriers to cooperation between the United States and 
foreign states." 209 This Article goes further in providing a cooperation 
204 Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157; Deeks, supra note 51, at 346. 
205 Deeks, supra note 51, at 305. This is not to say that other frameworks do not 
recognize that the privacy right is not absolute. To the contrary, they uniformly allow 
for privacy intrusions in some circumstances. However, what distinguishes Deeks' 
scholarship from the other works is an explicit recognition that the goal of the 
framework should not be to achieve the maximum privacy protections possible. 
206 Deeks, supra note 51, at 351-63 (the six procedural norms are 1) notice to public of 
applicable rules, 2) limits on the reasons for data collection and use, 3) requirement for 
periodic reviews, 4) limits on data retention, 5) preference for domestic surveillance, 
and 6) neutral oversight body). 
207 Id. at 366. 
208 Margulies, supra note 173, at 2157. Margulies' procedural protections include 1) 
notice about grounds for surveillance, 2) oversight of surveillance programs, 3) 
deterrence of arbitrary official conduct, including targeting of political opponents or 
disfavored ethnic, racial, or religious groups, and includes procedural flexibility for 
state implementation. Id. 
209 Id. at 2165. 
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framework tailored to a thorough and detailed exploration of inter-
governmental intelligence sharing. 
C. Proposed Framework 
As noted supra in Part 0, widespread disagreement persists over the relevant 
international law governing intelligence sharing. This framework utilizes 
commonly cited principles of international law as a helpful starting point. 
Drawing on prior literature, I condense the fourteen international law 
principles of government surveillance identified by Necessary & 
Proportionate210 into 5 primary categories: 1) principle of legality 2) principle 
of safeguarding against abuse 3) principle of proportionality 4) principle of 
transparency and oversight 5) principle of notification and remedies. In order 
to tailor this framework to the challenges of intelligence sharing, I include 
three additional considerations: 6) the principle of complementarity 7) the 
principle of good faith and 8) the exigency exception. Using this framework, 
I outline a way forward for governing intelligence sharing while respecting 
legitimate differences in countries' privacy-security balance. 
In devising a framework for governmental intelligence sharing, one 
approach would be to adopt a highest common denominator and to use the 
same standards to govern intelligence sharing as are used for law enforcement 
sharing and other police activities. Some privacy rights advocates, including 
Privacy International, have opted for this approach. 211 Such individuals can 
point to American law, which grants the same Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection to American citizens, regardless of whether the surveillance arises 
in the context of petty crime or dire threats to national security. 212 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court famously held in the Keith case, a government's national 
security concerns /1 do not justify departure in this case from the customary 
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a 
210 See Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104 (condensing the fourteen necessary and 
proportionate principles into thirteen categories). 
211 See Brown, supra note 154, at 23-25 (conflating intelligence and law enforcement 
privacy standards). 
212 See infra note 218. 
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search or surveillance." 213 However, as Professor Schulhofer notes, for many 
democratic countries, "such fundamental issues as the required level of 
suspicion, the role of suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree 
to which transparency and oversight are relaxed in the national security 
context." 214 
There are good reasons for differentiating intelligence and law 
enforcement data collection. For example, intelligence purposes may 
fundamentally differ from those of law enforcement: "Intelligence often 
searches for new information, whereas law enforcement often looks for 
additional information."215 This purposive difference reasonably leads to one 
to expect different evidentiary standards-"probable cause" often poses a 
prohibitively challenging standard when searching for new information. 
Therefore, this paper rejects the notion that the same criminal law enforcement 
information sharing standards should also apply to intelligence sharing. 
"In the field of monitoring bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing 
arrangements, there has been particular inadequacy of oversight." 216 Thus far, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed the most 
comprehensive case law on surveillance. However, as the Court's name 
suggests, the ECtHR "takes the community interest in the right to privacy and 
the corresponding state duty to respect that community obligation very 
seriously." 217 As such, it comes as little surprise that privacy advocates 
213 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 321 
(1972) (holding government's national security concerns "do not justify departure in 
this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval 
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance."). 
214 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 245 ("There is wide variation, even among Western 
democracies, on such fundamental issues as the required level of suspicion, the role of 
suspect-specific judicial approval ex ante, and the degree to which transparency and 
oversight are relaxed in the national security context."). 
215 Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reform: Some Thoughts From Civil Society, LAWFARE (Sep. 11, 
2015 ), https ://www .lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-ci vil-society. 
216 Lubin, supra note 51, at 548. 
217 Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 2. Because the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) views privacy as a human right, its jurisprudence has found that "all 
persons are covered and are guaranteed the same treatment by the state." Id. As noted 
in Part VII.A, this interpretation is contested as a matter of international law. 
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campaign for the ECtHR as the privacy floor. The CJEU decision in Kadi v. 
Commission has provided ammunition for the "privacy floor" approach by 
establishing that "EU concepts on fundamental rights prevail, whenever this 
is necessary, over international law." 218 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has developed its jurisprudence while leaving 
some room for discretion, and despite its privacy-protective orientation, many 
of the ECtHR privacy decisions have recognized the need for flexibility in the 
intelligence space.219 For example, while the ECtHR has recognized "rather 
strict standards" governing the interception of communication, the Court has 
expressly recognized that those standards do not necessarily apply in other 
intelligence gathering contexts.22° Furthermore, the European Court has taken 
the reasonable approach of recognizing the existence of tradeoffs, and has not 
perpetuated the mistaken notion that surveillance constitutes a per se 
violation of human rights. 221 Even Privacy International acknowledges that 
intelligence activities necessarily cannot operate with complete transparency 
over the scope and nature of government intelligence-sharing agreements.222 
While the ECtHR provides one possible approach, its institutional mission-
218 Hielke Hijmans, The European Union As Guardian of Internet Privacy: The Story of 
Art 16 TFEU, 31 L. GOVERNANCE & TECH. SERIES 1, 473 (2016) 
https://link.springer .com/ content/pdf/10.1007 /978-3-319-34090-6.pdf. 
219 Respondent's Open Response, Privacy Int'l v. United Kingdom, Case No. 
IPT/13/92/CH, (Investigatory Powers Trib. 2014) (U.K.) and Liberty v. United 
Kingdom, Case No. IPT/13/77/H (Investigatory Powers Trib. 2014) (U.K.) [hereinafter 




220 Id. (citing Uzun v. Germany (2011) 53 EHRR 24, at §66). See also McE v. Prison 
Service of Northern Ireland [2009] 1 AC 908, per Lord Carswell at§ 85. 
221 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 119. 
222 Human Rights Implications of Intelligence Sharing, PRIVACY INT'L 9 (2017), 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-
12/PI%20Briefing%20to%20National%20Intelligence%200versight%20Bodies_12_Sep 
t.pdf ("Privacy International specifically urges national intelligence oversight bodies, 
to the extent permitted under their mandates, to: make publicly available as much 
information as possible as to the nature and scope of intelligence sharing arrangements 
to which their governments are party, as well as the rules governing such 
arrangements[.]"). 
53 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF [Vol. IX: I 
orientation leads to an uncompromising approach that does not accommodate 
the privacy-security balance adopted by most countries. In contrast, the 
framework below secures meaningful privacy protections while still 
preserving maximal respect for sovereign discretion. 
i. Principle of Legality 
A basic requirement for the rule of law is that rules must be based in law, with 
a degree of foreseeability and accessibility. This principle of legality is 
generally uncontroversial and considered a core principle of international 
law.223 Intelligence-sharing arrangements should have these provisions to the 
extent reasonably practicable. It is true that political considerations may 
weigh in favor of preventing the public disclosure of intelligence cooperation 
with some countries,224 but the principles by which governments conduct 
themselves in the intelligence-sharing process would not adversely affect their 
capacity to conduct their jobs. At the same time, such principles would also 
provide a circulated standard against which intelligence agencies, their 
counterparts, and oversight bodies could hold agency action accountable. 
Both the United States and the EU agree that the ICCPR requires some 
respect for privacy rights of those under a country's domestic jurisdiction. 
Specifically, that states have an obligation to refrain from /1 arbitrary or 
unlawful interference" into the private lives of those under the state's 
domestic jurisdiction.225 This principle of legality is expressed in the first 
clause of Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, stating 
223 Beth Van Schaack, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law, 103 AM. 
Soc. OF INT'L L. 101, 101 (2009) ("The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is a 
fundamental principle of criminal law. It has particular resonance at the international 
level given the relative lack of clarity surrounding certain international legal norms."). 
224 See generally Ashley Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret Agreements, 49 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 713 (2017) 
http://arizonastatelawjournal.org!wp-content/ uploads/2017 /09 /Deeks_ Pub. pdf. 
225 Deeks, supra note 51, at 305 ("The United States, for example, believes that states 
may engage in surveillance that is in accordance with transparent laws and that 
furthers a legitimate aim. Human rights groups favor a higher standard drawn from 
ECtHR case law: The interference must be necessary in the circumstances of the case 
and proportional to the end sought, and the surveillance must be conducted under 
specific and clearly defined laws."). 
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that "[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law. 11226 In other words, the 
exercised powers have some basis in domestic law and meet a foreseeability 
requirement.227 Accordingly, secret rules without any basis in domestic 
legislation cannot be in accordance with the law for the purposes of restricting 
rights. 228 This 'accordance with the law' requirement poses a low standard; 
even broad delegations of power, such as those in the Chinese National 
Security Law, 229 have a basis in domestic law.230 This delegation may be 
analogized to the broad "intelligible principle" requirement in American 
administrative law and is unlikely to carry significant substantive impact 
beyond public accessibility to the relevant law. 231 
However, the law must also enable a degree of foreseeability. This has led 
international privacy scholars to argue that privacy rights require that "[a]ny 
limitations to the right to privacy 'must be provided for by law, and the law 
must be sufficiently accessible, clear, and precise so that an individual may 
look to the law and ascertain who is authorized to conduct data surveillance 
and under what circumstances."' 232 As interpreted by the ECtHR, the essential 
test for foreseeability asks whether the laws sufficiently indicate the scope of 
discretion and the manner of exercise "to give the individual adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference." 233 However, the ECtHR highlights 
226 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 25 (emphasis added). 
227 Brown et al., supra note 199. 
22s Id. 
229 See supra notes 124, 125. 
230 But see Szabo & Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II 
78 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020. 
231 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 ("If Congress shall 
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power."). 
232 Lubin, supra note 51, at 542. 
233 Malone v United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) 7 Eur. H.R. Rep 14, §86. See 
also Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173, 
Admissibility, §§ 78-79 (2006 ), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/ content/pdf/001-
76586 (the laws must be sufficiently detailed to give "an adequate indication" to the 
times and circumstances under which the government may engage in surveillance 
activities). 
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that the foreseeability requirement should not be taken to preclude effective 
surveillance: "the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an 
individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to 
intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly." 234 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has echoed the 
generally-accepted the legality requirement, interpreting surveillance carried 
out on the basis of a law to require (a) public accessibility and (b) sufficient 
precision for reasonable foreseeability of the consequences of certain 
conduct.235 
In the intelligence-sharing context, applying the legality principle makes 
sense. States should have laws governing intelligence sharing. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights has noted 
The absence of laws to regulate information-sharing agreements 
between States has left the way open for intelligence agencies to 
enter into classified bilateral and multilateral arrangements that are 
beyond the supervision of any independent authority. Information 
concerning an individual's communications may be shared with 
foreign intelligence agencies without the protection of any publicly 
accessible legal framework and without adequate (or any) 
safeguards .... Such practices make the operation of the surveillance 
regime unforeseeable for those affected by it. 236 
While security concerns may weigh in favor of limiting the disclosure of 
specific information sharing arrangements, laws delineating the general 
circumstances and procedures under which a government engages in 
intelligence sharing would allow "sufficient adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference" and offset concerns of unbridled government power to 
234 Malone v United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, (1984) 7 Eur. H.R. Rep 14, § 67. See 
also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 
75 (2013) ("The State must be transparent with respect to the laws regulating 
communications surveillance and the criteria used for their application. The principle 
of 'maximum disclosure' is applicable to this issue."). 
235 See Bignami & Resta, supra note 97. The UNHCHR elements also include (c) 
provisions ensuring legitimate aims and (d) effective safeguards against abuse, but (c) 
and (d) simply suggest a divergent taxonomy, as both concern safeguards against 
abuse addressed below. 
236 Lubin, supra note 51, at 548-49. 
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exchange private information without due consideration of individual privacy 
interests. Adopting public intelligence sharing standards would achieve this 
goal and provide the legally grounded governance standards expected in the 
international community. 
Getting states to recognize the legality principle should prove relatively 
uncontroversial, and states' acceptance would not likely face ideological 
resistance. The difficulty arises at the implementation stage over which 
safeguards adequately ensure that the government does not engage in 
arbitrary or unlawful interference. For example, the United States believes 
that this limitation is satisfied as long as its surveillance is consistent with 
transparent laws and furthers a legitimate aim, whereas the ECtHR adds 
additional principles of necessity and proportionality. 237 The next section 
seeks to untangle the morass over what should count as sufficient safeguards 
against abuse. 
ii. Principle of Safeguards against Abuse 
The appropriate intelligence-sharing framework should delineate procedural 
requirements that safeguard against abuse. In order to fulfill the legality 
principle, countries sharing information should both have publically issued 
safeguarding procedures governing their intelligence practices. In Weber and 
Saravia v. Germany, the ECtHR helpfully identified six procedural safeguards 
to govern European communications interception: 
[1] the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception 
order; 
[2] a definition of the categories of people liable to have their 
telephones tapped; 
[3] a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; 
237 Deeks, supra note 51, at 305-06 ("The United States, for example, believes that 
states may engage in surveillance that is in accordance with transparent laws and that 
furthers a legitimate aim. Human rights groups favor a higher standard drawn from . 
. . [ECtHR] case law: The interference must be necessary in the circumstances of the 
case and proportional to the end sought, and the surveillance must be conducted under 
specific and clearly defined laws."). 
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[4] the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the 
data obtained; 
[5] the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to 
other parties; 
[6] and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased 
or the tapes destroyed238 
[Vol. IX: I 
For the purpose of intelligence sharing, Categories [1], [3], [4] and [5] are most 
important. 
First, states should publically disclose the nature of the offenses and 
purposes that warrant intelligence sharing. Intelligence sharing should 
remain limited to exchanges of intelligence information for national security 
purposes and should not operate as a loophole for the transfer of other types 
of information. In order for the information to be shared through intelligence 
channels, the collected information should have been collected for security 
purposes. For example, the United States has committed to exclusively 
collecting signals intelligence for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
purposes to support national and departmental missions. 239 Intelligence 
sharing agreements should provide similar commitments to exclusive 
national security utilization among both the collecting and transferring 
parties. This is particularly important in light of concerns that signals 
intelligence may be utilized for the "purpose of suppressing or burdening 
criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, 
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion." 240 While states will differ on the 
extent to which these protected categories may factor into national security 
practices, establishing clear purposes for intelligence exchange facilitates 
effective oversight and provides clear normative guidelines for the state's 
intelligence apparatus. While Category [2] would help provide foreseeability 
to know the specific categories of individuals liable to have their information 
238 Lubin, supra note 51 (citing Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-
XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173, Admissibility, 'II 95 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
webservices/content/ pdf/001-76586, ). 
239 See PPD-28, supra note 96. 
240 See id. 
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shared, a definition of the purposes for which states may exchange intelligence 
information provides greater utility in parsing foreseeable exchanges. 
Category [3] and [6] highlight the procedures governing temporal 
limitations on information sharing. While the sharing of analyzed information 
does not contain a temporal aspect, joint intelligence ventures collecting raw 
information could persist for an undisclosed amount of time. As a result, 
intelligence-sharing laws should incorporate procedures for determining the 
appropriate duration of raw intelligence sharing operations. All transferred 
information could be subject to a sunset clause requiring the erasure of shared 
intelligence information after six months absent explicit reauthorization. 241 
Category [4] concerns important procedures related to accessing, 
retaining, and storing transferred information. The procedures should 
address technological procedures related to the safe storage of intelligence 
information in a secure server, record keeping procedures, and logs to account 
for the use or forensic inspection of the information use. Moreover, while 
analyzed information should be appropriately tailored to the scope of the 
request, both raw intelligence and analyzed intelligence will usually contain 
personal information, and the transfer of such information should not result 
in a total abdication of access controls. Therefore, states should clarify the 
scope of their access controls and related procedures. For example, the 
German surveillance authorization act examined in Weber provided /1 detailed 
rules on storing and destroying any data obtained using these search terms, 
and the authorities storing the data had to verify every six months whether 
the data were still necessary to achieve the purpose for which they had been 
obtained or transmitted to them." 242 
Access controls are especially important given the variation in the 
conceptualization of privacy harms. On the one hand, European Courts have 
found that "that the storage of private information amounts to or is akin to 
241 See, e.g., Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses 
[Artikel 10-Gesetz] [G 10] [Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail, and 
Telecommunications] [Article 10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBl. I at 1254, 2298, as amended, 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gl0_2001/gesamt.pdf (requiring 
authorities storing the data had to verify every six months whether the data were still 
necessary to achieve the purpose for which it had been gathered). 
242 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 113. 
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secret surveillance." 243 Under this conception, the mere collection of 
information constitutes a privacy harm. However, many states take a different 
approach to data access and argue that "[u]ntil the data are accessed by 
humans and used as a means of investigating or identifying particular people 
... , no concrete intrusion has occurred." 244 As Deeks reports, "states seem 
committed to the idea that they require access to as much data as possible to 
accurately locate terrorist plots and connections among suspected terrorists, 
among other threats." 245 Both offer legitimate approaches to balancing 
243 Matthew White, Protection by Judicial Oversight, or an Oversight in Protection?, 2 J. 
INFO. RTS., PoL'Y, & PRACTICE 1, 33 ("The ECtHR has previously noted that e-mail and 
internet usage fall within the ambit of Article 8334 and on numerous occasions has held 
that the storage of private information amounts to or is akin to secret surveillance."). 
See also Lubin, supra note 51, at 515 ("As was explained by Commissioner Pillay, an 
interference with the right to privacy already occurs at the point of interception."). 
244 Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases and Surveillance: Five Regulatory 
Categories, 28 (Nat'l Const. Ctr. White Paper Series, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2551164 ("It is further assumed by the intelligence 
community that the infringement of the data subjects' rights takes place only at the 
point at which their data is retrieved from the "haystack on the basis of a search term, 
keyword, or other selector."). Deeks points to some United States courts that have 
taken this approach. Deeks, supra note 51, at 357 ("This is consistent, for instance, with 
the approach some U.S. courts have taken to the Fourth Amendment; for them, a search 
(and therefore an infringement on privacy) occurs when information is exposed to 
possible human observation, rather than when it is copied or processed by a 
computer."). But see Daskal, supra note 62, at 354 (cataloging the "rich and thick 
literature" contending that simple data collection inflicts severe privacy harm); Neil M. 
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (2013), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2239412 (arguing that surveillance "menaces intellectual privacy and 
increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination" and should comprise a 
harm sufficient for constitutional standing). 
245 Deeks, supra note 51, at 357. Such logic proceeds as follows: The retention of 
information is critical because one cannot know when it will come in handy. One can 
analogize to the use of Box, Dropbox or an external hard drive. You never know which 
document is going to crash, so you back up all documents. Similarly, with intelligence 
collection -there is a vast degree of available information, and intelligence officials 
don't know what will come in handy later down the line. While one might push back 
to suggest that, using the back-up example, there is no need to save every piece of 
information. Instead, one prioritizes different documents to different degrees. For 
example, losing a shopping list would carry far less severe consequences than the loss 
of a 70-page research paper. However, such an argument misunderstands the nature 
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privacy and security.246 Brown et al disagree, arguing that the latter approach 
"cannot be reconciled with international human rights law." 247 However, 
Brown and his colleagues ground their claim of international human rights 
law on European human rights law; thereby conflating the privacy-security 
tradeoff for one regime with that of the entire international community. 248 
Nevertheless, the differing points of restriction should encourage states to 
consider access control safeguards. States that impose a higher barrier to data 
of data retention. The problem with discordant pieces of information is that, prior to 
an incident in question, one does not know which information will prove most 
necessary. As such, the more appropriate analogy would be to ask which sources 
would prove most valuable at the very onset of a research project. Without knowing 
the direction of the project, it can be nearly impossible to know which information to 
prioritize in advance. 
246 The collection process and storage of information, in addition to the distribution 
of information under the control of private companies versus government entities are 
important questions beyond the scope of this discussion. 
247 Brown et al., supra note 199. 
248 To be sure, Brown et al. is correct as a matter of European law. The Court in Szabo 
& Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment, 'II 78 (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-160020, recognized that mass surveillance could 
undermine citizen freedom if all privacy barriers were eliminated. 
Indeed, it would defy the purpose of government efforts to keep terrorism at bay, if 
the terrorist threat was paradoxically substituted for by a perceived threat of unfettered 
executive power intruding into citizens' private spheres by virtue of uncontrolled yet 
far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives. 
However, such a portrayal rests on the notion that there must in fact be an 
intrusion -that information is actually accessed. It is also true that the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, argued that despite "[t]he 
prevention and suppression of terrorism [being] a public interest imperative of the 
highest importance," bulk collection programs "pose a direct and ongoing challenge to 
an established norm of international law." Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism), Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sep. 23, 2014). However, United Nations 
officials' pontifications on international law do not determine the state of international 
law. 
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collection tend to employ fewer safeguards at the data access phase. 249 In 
contrast, states that do not consider privacy interests at the collection state will 
likely employ measures that restrict access to more limited criteria of 
conditions and circumstances. 250 Thus, access procedures for transferred data 
should include measures to condition access to exchanged information, even 
if state surveillance practices do not contain any access requirements.251 
Conditioning access on state-specific safeguards-further expanded in Part 
0-plays a critical role in protecting the legitimate privacy interests in 
disparate privacy-security regimes. 
Finally, Category [5] concerns third party transfers. As such, it necessarily 
incorporates all of the suggested procedures and principles outlined in this 
framework for cross-border intelligence sharing. However, it also concerns 
onward transfers from the receiving agency. The onward transfers may be 
internal; many countries have seen a decline in the "wall" separating national 
security and other law enforcement uses. 252 Intelligence transfers should be 
limited to national security purposes, and measures should be undertaken to 
maintain a wall over transferred information. If the recipient country would 
also like to access shared intelligence for law enforcement purposes, it should 
pursue that information through the appropriate channels. Intelligence 
sharing should not serve as a shortcut around MLAT agreements. 
249 For example, the United Kingdom, which imposes collection restrictions, does not 
distinguish between collection and access. DAVID ANDERSON, A QUESTION OF TRUST-
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS REVIEW, 292-94, 2015, 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
06/IPR-Report-Web-Accessiblel.pdf (illustrating that the United Kingdom does not 
distinguish between collection and access). 
250See Rangappa, supra note 36 (discussing the United States bulk data collection 
pursuant to § 702 which contain access protections that ensure that "neither the 
metadata nor the content of that communication is immediately accessible to all 
agents."). 
251 See Deeks supra note 51, at 305 (explaining the United States permits surveillance 
as long as its surveillance is consistent with transparent laws and furthers a legitimate 
aim but does not require proportionality or necessity). 
252 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 105 ("In many countries, this wall has been 
dismantled, with the result that intelligence agencies may now, at least as a matter of 
legal authority, pass information to law enforcement officials .... "). 
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The receiving agency might also seek onward transfers of shared 
information to external parties. Governments receiving information should 
commit to ensuring that exchanged intelligence information is not shared with 
non-governmental parties. However, government intelligence agencies 
should have the flexibility to share such information with other government 
intelligence partners, in the event that the receiving party commits to the same 
transfer restrictions as binding the original recipient. Of course, governments 
have no obligation to share information with a third party, and political 
considerations effectively restrain third-party intelligence sharing against the 
originator's wishes. Integrating data access and data sharing procedures 
would help offset a major barrier to intelligence sharing: the difficulties that 
countries face in verifying how a foreign government will use information sent 
to it.253 
In sum, safeguards against abuse should include 1) public limitations on 
the purposes of government intelligence sharing; 2) public limitations on the 
duration of sharing agreements and the implementation of sunset clauses; 3) 
public access, retention, and storage procedures for exchanged information; 4) 
and public commitment to third-party transfer procedures ensuring that 
exchanged intelligence information remains limited to government 
intelligence use. 
iii. Principle of Transparency and Oversight 
Intelligence sharing agreements should not operate in a vacuum of 
accountability. The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age, which calls upon all states "[t]o establish or maintain 
existing independent, effective, adequately resourced and impartial judicial, 
administrative and/or parliamentary domestic oversight mechanisms capable 
of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State 
surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of 
personal data . . ."254 Furthermore, modern norms have led to a public 
253 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 ("[I]ntelligence services lose full control of 
information as soon as they transmit it to another body."). 
254 G.A. Res 69/166, at 4 (Dec. 18, 2014). See Emmerson, supra note 248 ("One of the 
core protections afforded by article 17 is that covert surveillance systems must be 
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expectancy of greater transparency over intelligence activities. 255 By 
establishing publically available governance measures for intelligence sharing 
agreements, states will take significant steps towards transparent practices. 
While the government cannot provide complete transparency to the public, it 
can provide more searching internal oversight procedures. 
Intelligence sharing agreements would benefit from the designation of a 
specific independent official or officials responsible for overseeing intelligence 
sharing exchanges and subsequent access. Many countries already have 
independent oversight of surveillance and government access, with China as 
a notable exception.256 Significantly, independent oversight does not implicate 
the government's chosen privacy-security tradeoff, but instead ensures that 
intelligence information is handled commensurate with that government's 
standards. For example, the United States has a Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Official who ensures the legitimate privacy interests of data handled by the 
intelligence community.257 Such a role should operate similarly to Inspector 
Generals, embedded in United States executive agencies. 
In order to effectively implement intelligence transfer access controls, each 
country must implement ex ante review. This oversight process already exists 
through Sweden's Defense Intelligence Inspection (SIUN) body, which 
monitors whether the procedural conditions have been complied with before 
transferring the information in question for use by Swedish intelligence.258 
attended by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse. These 
safeguards may take a variety of forms, but generally include independent prior 
authorization and/or subsequent independent review."). However, the Special 
Rapporteur goes too far in asserting the mass collection schemes are necessarily 
inconsistent with principles of individualized suspicion. 
255 Deeks, supra note 63, at 618 ("Overall, the public now expects greater transparency 
about intelligence activities and some governments have begun to provide it."). 
256 Rubinstein et al., supra note 30, at 104. 
257 PPD-28, supra note 96 (describing the principles of United States signals 
intelligence collection). 
258 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Update 
of the 2007 Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services and Report on the 
Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies, CDL-AD(2015)006, Study No. 
719/2013, '1!'1!131-133 (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/ 
default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)006-e ("An example of a model which combines 
judicial authorization with expert follow-up comes from Sweden."). 
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Former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation David Anderson has 
proposed a series of possible ex ante criteria that the UK could implement for 
bulk data access. 259 This ex ante review requirement aligns with a CJEU 
emphasis on the importance of independent authorization.260 When assessing 
government access to retained data, the CJEU has held that all access should 
"be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent 
administrative body." 261 Prior review constitutes a best practice and should 
be implemented across all states. Oversight independence should be 
established through the criteria that 1) the overseer can only be removed for 
cause; 2) the overseer is not appointed by the executive branch; and 3) the 
overseer is not involved in the intelligence exchange mission. 
Professor Richard Aldrich conceives the possibility of "Inspectors General 
with extended authority to operate in more than one country." 262 Given that 
countries will display a variety of different procedures and processes, a roving 
Inspector General should not be a requirement for sharing compliance. 
Nevertheless, a joint Inspector General would add particular value in joint raw 
data collection enterprises. These joint enterprises, such as the compilation of 
joint databases, poses greater privacy risks and would be well-served by 
another layer of protection. Furthermore, this close-knit form of "far 
reaching" cooperation is only likely to occur if the states maintain a /1 close, 
259 ANDERSON, supra note 249, at 292-94 (following the British model which does not 
distinguish between collection and access). 
260 Ex ante authorization is not a uniquely European requirement, and the U.S. has 
played a significant role in promulgating an ex ante review ethos. As Jennifer Daskal 
reports, "[t]he UK government supported a new judicial review mechanism for 
intercept orders in part because it knew that this would be a precondition entering into 
such an agreement under US law." Jennifer Daskal, New Bill Would Moot Microsoft 
Ireland Case-And Much More!, JUST SEC. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https ://www.justsecurity.org/51886/bill-moot-microsoft-ireland-case-more. 
261 Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-Och telestyrelsen, 2016 
EUR-Lex 62015CJ0203 (Dec. 21 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0203&from=EN ("In order to ensure, in practice, that 
those conditions are fully respected, it is essential that access of the competent national 
authorities to retained data should, as a general rule, except in cases of validly 
established urgency, be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an 
independent administrative body[.])". 
262 Aldrich, supra note 9, at 56. 
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trust-based relationship." 263 Given the muted secrecy concerns, such a 
cooperative arrangement with an objective third-party Inspector General is 
conceivable for a subset of states with a high commitment to public 
transparency. 264 Such bodies could operate along lines similar to the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in its designation and 
ability to inspect treatment of prisoners of war, 265 or the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) mandate to inspect nuclear sites. Specifically, joint 
intelligence operations could include an arrangement to allow an objective 
party to inspect and provide reports on compliance of procedural privacy 
safeguards. 266 
Intelligence sharing agreements should also require states to include a 
measure of ex post review to ensure that the surveillance measures undertaken 
are done so according to the procedures in place. Particularly when security 
exigencies require urgent government action, ex post review provides 
prospective control over future behavior. As the ECtHR recognizes "a 
subsequent judicial review can offer sufficient protection if a review procedure 
at an earlier stage would jeopardise [sic] the purpose of an investigation or 
263 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 19. 
264 See Aldrich, supra note 9 (suggesting inspectors general with extended authority 
in more than one state). 
265 See, e.g., Rule 124. ICRC Access to Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, INT'L COMM. 
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ customary-ihl/eng/ docs/vl_rul_rule124 ("The 
right of the ICRC to visit detainees in international armed conflicts is provided for in 
the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions."). 
266 Preexisting bilateral and multilateral exchanges between external oversight bodies 
might provide a foundational framework for building international acceptance. 
Examples of such bodies include "periodic meetings with national parliamentary 
oversight committees organized by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; the annual Southeast European Parliamentary 
Oversight Bodies' Conference; the biennial International Intelligence Review Agency 
Conference (IIRAC); and the (now defunct) Conference of the Parliamentary 
Committees for the Oversight of Intelligence and Security Services of the European 
Union Member States." BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 156. An institutional entity could 
also provide other benefits, such as a rigorous training program that could provide best 
practices for privacy protection. Such a training program could help promote 
responsible handling of personal information and diminish the fears of privacy harm 
stemming from intelligence practices. See Kent, supra note 186, at 12 (recommending 
international standards of training for law enforcement data requests). 
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surveillance."267 Domestic audits offer one effective form of ex post review. 
Such an inspection process should occur at regular intervals, with reviewable 
information based on the time of access or, in exceptional circumstances, as 
promptly as possible. In addition, an oversight body could scrutinize the 
procedural compliance through methods such as hearings, documentary 
analysis, interviews and sampling.268 Scheduled inspections could be further 
supplemented by surprise visits. In Norway, a national model is already in 
place, where the Parliament's Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS) has the 
power to conduct surprise inspection visits for shared data. 269 
Finally, each state should provide whistleblower protection in the event 
of abuse of intelligence sharing agreements. Given the sensitivity of 
intelligence operations, whistleblower protections do not need to extend to the 
release of information to the public.270 However, each state should ensure that 
government employees or officials may report violations of protocols and 
procedures to the relevant oversight bodies without fear of retribution. 
iv. Principle of Proportionality 
States disagree about the need for a proportionality analysis in their own 
surveillance operations. The United States, for example, only requires 
surveillance to meet a legitimate national security purpose, but the European 
Union requires proportionality.271 The ECtHR in Weber and Saravia established 
267 Sommer v. Germany, App. No. 73607/13, Eur. Ct. H.R., 15 (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=OOl-173091. However, this model contests the 
ECtHR's' subsequent proclamation that "the effectiveness of a subsequent judicial 
review is inextricably linked to the question of subsequent notification about the 
surveillance measures. There is, in principle, little scope for recourse to the courts by 
an individual unless he or she is advised of the measures taken without his or her 
knowledge and thus able to challenge the legality of such measures retrospectively." 
Id. 
268 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 147-48 (discussing some principle methods of review 
for data sharing). 
269 Id. at 148. 
270 This more circumscribed view almost certainly departs from the whistleblower 
protection envisioned by the Snowden Treaty Advocates calling for "international 
protections for whistleblowers." The Snowden Treaty, supra note 195. 
271 See Deeks, supra note 51 (assessing the differences between the United States' and 
the ECtHR approach). 
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a European balancing test that weighs /1 all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds 
required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out 
and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law." 272 
Countries will continue to differ in their decisions whether to insert 
proportionality considerations in their intelligence practices. Nonetheless, 
when it comes to sharing intelligence, proportionality considerations should 
not be wholly absent from either the sharing or accessing of foreign 
intelligence information. 
First, states should condition their access of shared intelligence 
information on a proportionality assessment. In order to access foreign 
analyzed intelligence information, states should engage in a balancing 
analysis weighing the degree of privacy intrusion, demonstrated by the nature 
of the data sought and the amount of data sought, 273 against the specific 
purpose for which the information is being accessed. It is important to note 
that the privacy intrusion calculation should focus on the content and volume of 
the information shared, and not the means by which that content was 
collected. While some might prefer that all foreign intelligence include the 
means by which such intelligence was collected, foreign states will not 
realistically divulge such information in most circumstances. Moreover, 
attempting to apply procedural collection processes across countries fails to 
account for the fact that another agency could have gathered the same 
information through a different process. For example, one intelligence agency 
might have obtained telephone records through a targeted bulk data 
collection, and another agency might have obtained the same telephone 
records with a warrant-or would have been able to do so if the relevant 
telephone company were located under its jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, states' domestic legislatures should retain significant 
leeway in applying access controls for accessing foreign-sourced analyzed 
information. These legislatures could prescribe the weight given to different 
factors in a proportionality assessment. For example, the United States might 
272 Weber & Saravia v. Germany, App No 54934/00, 2006-XI [2006] Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173, 
Admissibility, 24 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-76586. 
273 Slobogin, supra note 244. 
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decide that U.S. intelligence services might only access foreign intelligence 
reports that target non-U.S. citizens. Alternatively, the U.S. might require the 
anonymization of U.S. citizen's personal information unless granted 
permission to reinsert redacted information by the FISA court. Any such 
access controls should be implemented by the receiving state. Through such a 
process, domestic legislation could control the parameters and risk of 
incidental use of domestically unattainable information. As explained in Part 
0, this process should be further bolstered by internal oversight to ensure that 
intelligence agencies do not abuse foreign intelligence sharing to circumvent 
their own collection limitations. Due to widely differing privacy-security 
tradeoffs, the access standards would likely exhibit wide variation. This 
framework does not recommend substantive access standards beyond the 
exigency exception in Part 0, but instead urges substantial flexibility in 
allowing sovereign states to determine the content of its access controls. 
States could create more robust access barriers that include collection 
methods for the transfer of raw intelligence. Since raw intelligence has not 
been altered from its initial collection form, its mode of collection is far more 
easily discernable. If sharing raw intelligence, states should be willing to 
either disclose the intelligence collection method or stipulate that the 
collection method would not have violated the intelligence collection laws of 
the partner state. Joint overseers, as suggested by Aldrich, 274 could facilitate 
the more rigorous implementation of state-specific access controls. 
States should also avoid transferring requested information without the 
partner state sharing a purpose or justification. Due to access control 
variations in state intelligence practice, states should adopt a limited 
proportionality assessment requiring legitimate justification when they 
consider intelligence requests by foreign intelligence partners. Specifically, 
states should confirm that their partners would use the information for a 
legitimate purpose. The implementation of the proportionality requirement 
might not substantively differ from the requirement to meet a national 
security purpose. However, the articulation of justification and oversight 
review will ensure that the shared intelligence information is only used in a 
274 See Aldrich, supra note 9. 
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manner consistent with that state's privacy security balance. Such analyses 
should apply to requests for both metadata and "content" data. 275 
Before transferring information to foreign intelligence partners, 
government intelligence officials should explicitly account for privacy 
interests in addition to security and political calculations. Nevertheless, the 
international community would be ill-served by the adoption of a "necessity" 
principle for data sharing. The UN Human Rights Experts' Brief in Kidane 
provides an operational definition for necessity: 
The requirement of necessity implies that restrictions must not 
simply be useful, reasonable or desirable to achieve a legitimate 
government objective. Instead, a State must demonstrate "in specific 
and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat" that it 
seeks to address, and a "direct and immediate connection between 
the expression and the threat.276 
Such a necessity requirement would force intelligence agencies to disclose 
national security threats to their partners and would also require admission of 
domestic vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their own national security 
regimes. Additionally, states differ in their perceptions of necessity based on 
potentially private information about the nature of domestic risks. 
Governments would likely be unwilling to disclose such information. 277 As 
275 Courts have increasingly recognized that both content data and metadata invoke 
significant privacy concerns. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige 
AB v. Post-Och telestyrelsen, 2016 EUR-Lex 62015CJ0203, 'II 199 (Dec. 21 2016), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0203 
&from=EN ("data [that] provides the means ... of establishing a profile of the 
individuals concerned, information that is no less sensitive, having regard to the right 
to privacy, than the actual content of communications."); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 416 (2012) ("And the Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that 
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse."). 
276 Brief of Amici Curiae United Nations Human Rights Experts in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 14, Doe (Kidane) v. Fed. Rep. of Eth., 851 F.3d 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 16-7081), 2016 WL 6476760. 
277 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2009) ("Even the probing of these 
[exchanges among the ministries and agencies of foreign countries on diplomatic, 
security, and intelligence issues] entails the risk that other countries will become less 
willing to cooperate with the United States in sharing intelligence resources to counter 
terrorism."). 
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such, the state requesting the information is best situated to evaluate its need 
of the information. While state with the information may refuse an 
intelligence request for any number of reasons, requiring a state to conduct a 
necessity test before transferring intelligence information would not serve the 
public world order in facilitating critical intelligence transfers. 278 
v. Principle of Notification and Remedies 
International human rights law also contains the principle of notification and 
remedies. Many states do not provide notifications of data use, and remedies 
vary widely across states. For intelligence sharing purposes, states should 
require notification to the originator state when the recipient state 
substantively accesses private information. Such provisions should also 
include flexibility for the state to delay notification for a limited period of time 
pursuant to ongoing operations. Mandatory state notifications would reduce 
information barriers and facilitate cooperative international self-governance. 
Moreover, any private right of action should be conditioned upon the 
principle of sovereign consent. 
Procedures for individual notification should rest on the specific state 
laws, and the state should have discretion over the circumstances and timing 
of notification that personal information has been accessed. The originator 
state should also control the degree of disclosure, or the level of specificity of 
which information was accessed or by whom. Importantly, the notification 
procedures should be codified into law. This process will create political 
accountability, and the scope of government notification commitments should 
respond to the political process.279 
A state-based notification system places the state as a guardian ad litem, 
charged with protecting the best interests of its citizens. In practice, 
intelligence sharing is policed by the understanding that violations "will be 
278 See, e.g., UK IPT Response, supra note 219, at '[208 (contending that "power to 
share intelligence with a foreign intelligence agency must plainly be capable of being 
'necessary"'). 
279 Admittedly, autocratic governments will tend to be less responsive to political 
pressure. However, the process of requiring even those governments to publically 
adopt a stance; even a zero-notification policy generates political pressure and 
encourages accountability. 
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sanctioned by reduction or cessation of future cooperation." 280 As such, if 
intelligence officials have reason to believe their intelligence partners are 
misusing shared information, they should think twice before participating in 
future intelligence exchanges. While intelligence officials may have incentives 
to turn a blind eye to privacy intrusive practices, the presence of independent 
oversight bodies will lead to official compliance with domestic laws regarding 
sharing notification procedures. 
Additionally, sovereign immunity principles weigh against allowing a 
private right of action absent state consent. Generally, sovereign governments 
are immune from lawsuits except to the extent that a government consents to 
a waiver of its immunity. 281 Sovereign immunity has also crystalized into a 
principle of customary international law forbidding suits against sovereign 
states in foreign jurisdictions without the states' consent. 282 Taken together, 
principles of state and international respect for sovereign immunity weigh 
against forcing a sovereign immunity waiver for an individual right of action. 
Nevertheless, the absence of a private right of action does not mean that 
individual privacy interests should remain untended. As explained above, the 
state has a responsibility to protect the privacy interests of its citizens. Against 
this backdrop, the cooperative nature of intelligence sharing leaves room for 
pressure and leverage through informal processes to deter future privacy 
violations. Finally, state oversight bodies have jurisdiction over privacy 
violations, and depending on the individual notification procedures, states 
can establish processes by which individuals or state representatives may 
bring claims against the government for procedural or substantive harms 
incurred as a result of an intelligence-sharing agreement. 283 
280 BORN ET AL., supra note 4, at 38. 
281 See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."). 
282 Xiaodong Yang, Sovereign Immunity, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-
9780199796953-0018 .xml. 
283 Ian Brown has gone so far as to suggest that "illegal surveillance should be 
criminalized." Brown, supra note 154, at 31. While states have the flexibility to 
criminalize surveillance activities, considerations underlying the United States' 
discretionary function exemption of official immunity likely applies here-namely, in 
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vi. Principle of Complementarity 
Another important international law principle relevant for intelligence 
sharing concerns complementarity. The principle of complementarity 
11 counsels deference based on both the imperatives of sovereignty and other 
provisions of international law, including the law of armed conflict and U.N. 
Security Council resolutions that require global cooperation to combat 
terrorism." 284 In the realm of privacy rights, complementarity encourages 
allowing a margin of flexibility for how states apply those rights in practice 
vis-a-vis security interests. The European Court of Human Rights recognized 
such a complementarity principle in Leander v. Sweden, holding that Sweden 
had a wide "margin of appreciation" when choosing the means for achieving 
the legitimate aim of protecting national security.28s 
When applied to intelligence sharing, the traditional complementarity 
principle receives reinforcement by the notion of international comity, or the 
idea that states should adjudicate their laws in a way that "respect[ s] the 
sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its own laws and their 
enforcement." 286 Concerns of comity should provide states with special 
flexibility in arranging intelligence sharing agreements. Specifically, this 
principle encourages states to grant greater deference to state national security 
practices than they might otherwise exercise in other contexts. The principle 
of complementarity provides the flexibility necessary to facilitate intelligence 
sharing in a world of differing privacy-security tradeoffs. 
vii. Principle of Good Faith 
The principle of good faith must govern intelligence sharing arrangements. 
Namely, all information requests and request fulfillments should be carried 
out in good faith. Such an obligation mimics the good-faith exception to the 
protecting the officials from "liability that would seriously handicap efficient 
government operations." United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). 
284 Margulies, supra note 173, at 2139. 
285 Leander v. Sweden, App No 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 at '[59 (1987). 
286 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 128 (2013). See generally Jesner 
v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (tackling questions of international comity). 
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United States' Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. United States courts 
generally do not permit the use of evidence collected in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.287 However, this exclusionary rule does not apply when an 
official conducts a search or seizure with a reasonable good faith belief that 
the search was consistent with the rule of law. 288 Similarly, national 
intelligence agencies should be able to share and utilize shared information as 
long as they have a reasonable good faith belief that both they and their 
intelligence partners have complied with the agreed-upon legal procedures.289 
This good faith principle plays a critical role in respecting the obligation 
that states do not use intelligence-sharing practices to circumvent domestic 
safeguards through revolving door tactics. United States Executive Order 
12333 establishes such a principle for U.S. conduct, and forbids members of 
the United States intelligence community from participating in or requesting 
any activities that they could not lawfully carry out themselves-including 
intelligence collection.290 Similarly, good faith privacy protection motivates 
the tailoring of information delivered in the course of surveillance requests. 
To the extent that domestic regimes of a receiving state provide higher 
standards of protection on a given issue, such as limitations on the use of 
national' s information, the presence of an independent oversight apparatus 
can also facilitate good-faith compliance. 
Just as states should not request foreign intelligence agencies to engage in 
unlawful practices, states should also not share data that they know the 
partner states could not collect. Instead, foreign states should undertake a 
good-faith effort to avoid sharing information that, to a non-trivial degree, 
relies on information that their intelligence partner could not have lawfully 
collected. This should not impose an obligation on states to comb their 
287 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
288 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary rule be more 
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable 
good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment."). 
289 Of course, the good faith "use" of information here differs from the exclusionary 
rule context; while the exclusionary rule is concerned with evidentiary inclusion, 
intelligence sharing involves utilization by information by other intelligence 
operatives. 
290 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.12 (1982). 
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analyzed intelligence reports to prevent any incidental disclosure of private 
information. Rather, the sharing states should make a good-faith effort to 
provide the information that the receiving state needs for implementing its 
access controls. For example, the United States might request a threat 
assessment of a particular organization from Great Britain, and that report 
might contain some information through a method that the receiving state 
could not have undertaken. The United States might not allow for foreign 
intelligence containing personal information on U.S. nationals in the absence 
of a warrant. In order for U.S. intelligence agencies to access the report, they 
might need to meet legislated access controls that require an independent 
authorizer to attest that the report does not contain information about U.S. 
citizens. If so, then the U.S. intelligence sharing request could request that the 
U.K. specify whether the report contains information about U.S. citizens so 
that the U.S. agency can undertake the necessary steps for authorized access. 
The UK should make a good faith effort to comply with such a request. If 
states adopt limitations that are too exacting, these exclusions could impose 
significant costs on each party. Including stakeholders from the intelligence 
agencies when designing access controls will go a long way towards 
minimizing the costs of such information requests. 
Without good faith, state intelligence sharing cannot operate out of the 
public eye. The intelligence sharing system must therefore be established in a 
fashion that breeds public trust in the processes and procedures undergirding 
these covert operations shrouded in secrecy.291 As former U.S. President 
Obama commented in light of United States anti-terrorism tactics, "If people 
can't trust not only the executive branch but also don't trust Congress and 
don't trust federal judges to make sure that we're abiding by the Constitution, 
due process and rule of law, then we're going to have some problems here." 292 
Public faith in the good will of the intelligence community is foundational to 
a robust security establishment. However, state security interests do not 
require blind faith. Good faith principles combined with publically available 
procedural safeguards can help shore up popular legitimacy. Taken together, 
291 For a list of benefits that arise from maintaining the secrecy of intelligence 
cooperation, see Deeks, supra note 224. 
292 See Nicholas & Gorman, supra note 34. 
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these seven principles allow for public disclosure and facilitate accountability 
without undermining the privacy-security tradeoff. 
viii. Exigency Exception for Non-Compliant States 
This framework should also anticipate that not every state would immediately 
adopt these principles. For the reasons outlined above, an effort to completely 
block intelligence sharing with non-compliant states would be both 
impractical and highly dangerous for all states involved. So how should states 
approach states who lack the important safeguards outlined in this 
framework? First, it is clear that intelligence agencies should be limited in 
their ability to share information with countries that do not adopt the policies 
consistent with the principles above. Nonetheless, not all intelligence sharing 
directly implicates individual privacy rights. As such, states can still share 
and receive strategic and operational information with non-compliant 
intelligence partners as long as the information does not contain personally 
identifiable information. For example, important policy analyses related to 
foreign policy developments or general threat assessments of a particular 
group will not necessarily disclose personal information.293 
One might imagine a situation in which an intelligence agency discovers 
information necessary to prevent a serious threat to the welfare of another 
state. In such circumstances, an exigency exception should prove appropriate. 
Specifically, this exigency exception should allow agencies to provide or 
receive necessary information, even if it includes personal information, in the 
limited scenario of a high-probability event that reasonably threatens the loss 
of life or substantial disruption to core operational services. Furthermore, the 
state must reasonably believe that the additional information presents 
"material" information germane to the reduction of the threat. Under these 
limited circumstances, non-compliant foreign partners may share intelligence 
information under the exigency exception. However, due to information 
asymmetries, the receiving state may realize that the shared information does 
not actually meet the exacting exigency standards. In these situations, the 
293 While one can make the case for a public figure exception whereby public figures 
enjoy diminished privacy protections, such an exploration lies beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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receiving state should still be able to utilize the information as long as it 
determines that the information was shared in good faith. 
The presence of exigent circumstances does not relieve a state of its 
responsibility to protect individual privacy. When states share information 
under such circumstances, they should seek to tailor the information granted 
to the specific request. When transferring information, states should limit 
sharing personally identifiable information to the extent reasonable. As part 
of this effort, states should avoid sharing raw intelligence data whenever 
feasible, and should instead convey the necessary information through 
analyzed "end product" intelligence. Additionally, compliant states should 
request that states receiving such intelligence only use this information for its 
intended purpose, although such an endeavor is unlikely to have any practical 
impact. 
While this framework sets the expected standards to govern state transfers 
of intelligence information to non-compliant states, states may carve out 
additional exceptions. While recipient states would not have the ability to 
share intelligence information received from framework-compliant states, all 
states would still retain the sovereign discretion to engage in additional 
sharing agreements with other states. However, any information received 
from non-compliant states would still be subject to the procedural 
requirements detailed above. While deviations from this framework would 
likely be domestically unpopular, one could imagine popular limited 
exceptions, such as one that allows countries to share information related to 
border migration, regardless of internal governance standards. 
This exigency exception should also apply to intelligence sharing among 
framework-compliant states. Specifically, the framework should allow the 
transfer of "exigent" information that would otherwise be barred due to 
revolving door concerns. Finally, in accordance with the principle of legality, 
states should undertake to codify the parameters of this exigency exception 
into domestic law. 
D. Application 
This Section seeks to concretize the above framework by testing the suggested 
framework against plausible scenarios. The scenarios focus on bilateral 
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intelligence sharing. Each of the below scenarios explore the actions that State 
A must take to comply with the proposed intelligence-sharing framework. 
i. Scenario One: Sharing Intelligence 
Suppose that State A's intelligence agency, while conducting surveillance in 
accordance with its domestic laws, intercepts six text message 
communications between two foreign nationals. The intercepted messages 
displays sympathies with a designated terrorist group's political goals, and 
mentions a willingness to further the group's cause in their home countries, 
States B and C. State A's intelligence agency would like to share this 
information with States B and C. However, State A has adopted laws 
implementing the proposed framework through public statutes, as required 
by the legality principle. How does State A proceed? 
State A must initially assess whether it can share the gathered information 
with States B and C. This assessment raises two questions. First, States A's 
intelligence community will need to look to the procedural requirements that 
State A has legislated into domestic law to determine whether sharing this 
information serves a legitimate purpose. State A will have legislated public 
limitations on the purposes of government intelligence sharing in according 
with the Principle of Safeguards Against Abuse. Let us assume that the 
legitimate purposes include the sharing of information to prevent threats to 
terrorism and national security, serious crimes, and threats to public safety. 
As such, the proposed information sharing would meet legitimate goals under 
the statute. 
Next, State A must assess whether States B and C have adopted this 
intelligence-sharing framework. Let us assume that State B has adopted the 
framework, but State Chas not. This difference leads the analysis to diverge 
for the subsequent steps of the intelligence sharing process. Let us first focus 
on State B. 
Because State B has adopted procedures consistent with the intelligence 
sharing framework, State A can easily assess State B's public laws to confirm 
that its intelligence sharing procedures provide the necessary procedural 
protections. Specifically, State A can confirm that State B has safe information 
storage procedures, has temporal limitations on the retention of shared 
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information, and will not engage in third- party transfers, except with 
intelligence agencies who have adopted this same framework. 
Under the sharing framework, State B will also need to conduct a 
proportionality test before accessing such information, balancing the nature of 
the data sought and the amount of data sought against the specific purpose 
for which the information is being accessed. Due to the fact that State B did 
not request the information (and therefore does not know enough to conduct 
the analysis), State A will need to explain the general nature of the intelligence. 
In this case, State A's explanation would detail the fact that State A identified 
text messages suggestive of a high-risk individual interested in aiding the 
terrorist's goals. State A would then deliver those six messages. An 
independent oversight officer in State B would then need to conduct a 
proportionality test before accessing that information. In this case, the 
government purpose would be to identify high-risk individuals for national 
security and the privacy intrusion would comprise the six messages, as well 
as the cell phone numbers of the communicators. Oversight officers in State B 
would liaise with officers in State A to ensure that State B has enough 
information to apply its domestic access controls. 
State B, after having accessed this information and finding cause for 
serious concern, might believe that more of the text messages contain 
important information. State B might request State A to transfer all 
intercepted text messages by one of the communicators for a three-month time 
frame. However, State B can only request such information if State B believes 
in good faith that State B's domestic law would allow the intelligence agency 
to lawfully intercept these messages. Even if State B would be legally 
permitted to obtain such information, the Principle of Safeguards Against 
Abuse requires State B to condition any access to the transferred text messages 
in line with all legislated access controls. 
The intelligence agencies in State A and State B would have the advice and 
counsel of their respective oversight officers as they transferred, processed, 
and accessed the shared information. Moreover, each agency would be subject 
to governmental audits to facilitate an ex post review. Once State B accesses 
the transferred intelligence data, State B must inform State A. State A will then 
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follow its domestic laws governing the relevant notification procedures to the 
parties in question. 
State A must take a different approach with State C. State C has not 
adopted the intelligence-sharing framework. As such, State A faces more 
limited options. State A can only share information if it falls into the exigency 
exception-namely, a high-probability event that reasonably threatens the 
loss of life or substantial disruption to core operational services. The 
identification of potentially dangerous terrorist sympathizers would not meet 
this high standard. Therefore, State A would not be able to share this 
intelligence information with State C (unless States A and C have negotiated 
a separate bilateral agreement). However, State A's inability to share the text 
messages does not mean that State A is completely hamstrung. State A can 
still warn State C without divulging any personal information. For example, 
State A might inform State C that they have reason to believe that State C has 
terrorist sympathizers in their country, and State C should exercise vigilance. 
In the event that State A later learned that one of the identified sympathizers 
has purchased explosives in preparation for a terrorist plot, State A would be 
able to share information with State C under the exigency exception. 
However, State A should avoid sharing raw intelligence information, and 
instead provide a report to State C identifying the suspect and the nature of 
the threat. 
ii. Scenario Two: Receiving Intelligence 
Imagine that through the course of its lawful intelligence practice, State A's 
intelligence services discover that two foreign individuals, residing in State B 
and citizens in State C, are likely involved in a plot against State A. State A 
only has limited intelligence on these individuals. As such, State A contacts 
its intelligence partners in State B and C to learn if they can provide 
information related to these two individuals and assist in their threat 
assessment. State B has adopted the proposed intelligence-sharing 
framework; State C has not. 
State B has also observed these two State C nationals with concern, and 
through an extensive bulk collection program, has pulled the raw 
communications data for these two suspected individuals for the last three 
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months, and has compiled analyzed reports. State B finds that State A's 
request meets a permissible purpose and has established procedures in 
accordance with the intelligence-sharing framework. After ensuring that the 
shared information is reasonably tailored to State A's request, State B shares 
its analyzed reports and communications interceptions with State A. 
State A cannot access the communications information without applying 
its own access controls. Imagine that State A's legislature has enacted rules 
that forbid its intelligence community to use bulk interception practices to 
gather information on any person and does not allow the access of foreign 
intelligence concerning any State A nationals without a judicial warrant. 
Before accessing the transferred information, an independent authorizer in 
State A would need to conduct an ex ante review to confirm that the transferred 
intelligence would not violate State A's access requirements. State A's 
authorizer reviews the transferred information and notices a reference to a 
State A national. The authorizer must then redact the information revealing 
personal information about the State A national. State A might ask whether 
the raw intelligence information was collected through bulk surveillance. 
State B would either have to answer State A's question or not share the bulk 
data. Assuming that State B explained that the information had been gathered 
through bulk interception, State A would then need to determine if there were 
a way by which State A could access the information. While State A might 
have an absolute rule allowing for no exceptions for bulk interceptions, it also 
might have a rule that permits access to a targeted subset of the bulk dataset 
with independent judicial authorization. Thus, State A's domestic legislation 
would determine State A's ability to access such information. If State A 
accesses personal information from State B's report, State A must notify State 
B. State B would then carry out notifications in line with the notification 
requirements outlined in its domestic legislation. State A would also need to 
erase the transferred data in accordance to agreed-upon retention limitations. 
Unless State A has a separate intelligence sharing agreement with State C, 
State A would probably not be able to receive information from State C. 
However, if State A's preexisting intelligence leads them to reasonably believe 
that a) the plot against State A poses a "high-probability event that reasonably 
threatens the loss of life or substantial disruption to core operational services," 
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and b) State C's intelligence could offer "material information germane to the 
reduction of the threat;" then State A could request such information from 
State C. However, any information received by State C under the exigency 
exception could only be used for the specific threat for which the information 
was requested. 
VI. DEFENSE AGAINST 
COMMON CRITIQUES 
A. Insufficient Privacy Protection 
The framework above will likely raise some critiques. Most predictable is the 
critique from the European privacy rights camp, arguing that the proposed 
framework will allow intelligence sharing of information with lesser privacy 
protections than are mandated by the European Court of Human Rights. 
Substantively, this criticism is correct. If one adopts a singular approach 
where privacy concerns operate as the only valid interest at play, then the 
above framework would inexcusably disregard fundamental rights. 
However, such an argument stumbles once one reintroduces a critically absent 
component: the context. As this Article demonstrates, privacy interests 
operate in tension with another fundamental right. While privacy activists will 
nominally recognize that their "fundamental" privacy right is not in fact 
absolute, such recognition is usually just that-nominal. Take for example 
Hielke Hijmans' s The European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy. In one 
line during his six-hundred page tome, Hijman recognizes that "[t]hreats to 
security may require restrictions to the exercise of fundamental rights." 294 
Even Hijmans's language is striking-"fundamental" rights connote absolute 
and inalienable qualities. Given the legitimate restriction of these rights, they 
clearly do not carry an absolute quality. If threats to security warrant the 
restriction of fundamental rights, then it serves to reason that threats to 
security also implicate fundamental rights. In short, there is a tradeoff here. 
Given the presence of a tradeoff between fundamental rights, privacy 
advocates' implicit paradigm of "security-bad, privacy-good" 
294 Hijmans, supra note 218, at 113-14. 
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inappropriately misconstrues the moral considerations. By downplaying the 
human rights interests in adequate security, privacy advocates paint their 
advocacy for greater privacy protections as a unilateral quest for maximizing 
human rights. For example, claims proliferate founded upon the assumption 
that strengthening privacy at the expense of security will lead to "the 
establishment of a high ceiling rather than a low floor for human rights 
protection and accountability." 295 Similarly, this blinkered viewpoint leads to 
characterizations of counterterrorism practices leading to privacy limitations 
as "[a] race to the bottom concerning the right to privacy." 296 Such pejorative 
language disparages legitimate security behavior protecting fundamental 
rights. 
The European Union, with support from privacy activists around the 
world, has staked out the moral high ground, declaring that their desired 
balance-and none others-deserve consideration or deference. As Maria 
Tzanou observes, "the EU has successfully constructed the image of itself as a 
'moral leader of good in the fight against terrorism due to its alleged higher 
respect to human rights standards compared to the US." 297 Hijman reports 
that European Council intentionally sought to set /1 globalization within a 
moral framework." 298 Once the privacy-security balance has been 'moralized,' 
the heart of the question becomes whether states can legitimately strike 
different balances along this spectrum. 
According to the European Union and privacy activists, that answer is no. 
The European Union has adopted its role on the basis that its values are 
"normatively desirable and universally applicable." 299 Hijmans provides a 
helpful descriptor for this practice: "regulatory imperialism." 300 The CJEU has 
encouraged this path towards European exceptionalism with its decision in 
Kadi: "EU concepts on fundamental rights prevail, whenever this is necessary, 
over international law. EU law contains principles that must be respected in 
295 Brown et al, supra note 199. 
296 Tzanou, supra note 144, at 101. 
297 Id. at 100. 
298 Hijmans, supra note 218, at 482-83. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/ 
10.1007 /978-3-319-34090-6.pdf. 
299 Id; see also Bignami & Resta, supra note 97, at 16. 
300 Hijmans, supra note 218, at 488. 
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the international domain, are not negotiable and subject to full review of the 
EU Courts." 301 
If one believes the European standard offers immutable expressions of 
absolute morality, then my framework will be troubling. Stephen Schulhofer 
has explicitly embraced this approach, and strenuously opposes the effort "to 
find international common ground" because multilateral negotiation would 
create a more permissive sharing regime that would create, in his morally-
infused words, "a race to the regulatory bottom." 302 Of course, for many, a 
major thrust of this intelligence sharing critique is that currently no country 
provides adequate privacy protections over intelligence transfers - European 
human rights law just provides the most promising path forward. 
The proposed framework compromises on privacy absolutist ideals in a 
number of ways. First, the framework argues that data access controls as 
opposed to data collection controls should not prohibit intelligence sharing 
agreements. The framework also largely defers the content of such access 
controls to the domestic state. Second, the framework applies a watered-down 
proportionality test, and does not call for an independent necessity test. 
Instead, it would allow legitimate government intelligence requests without 
an inquiry or adjudication into alternative pathways for acquiring such 
information. Third, it does not require governments to authorize 
whistleblowing to the general public. Fourth, it provides for state-notification 
and does not mandate individual notification. Fifth, it does not demand an 
individual right of action. Nevertheless, the adoption of such a framework 
would pose a major step forward for privacy rights by legislating overdue 
transparency and oversight in a field long obscured by a foggy ether. 303 
Privacy concerns animated by domestic surveillance practices are also 
mitigated in intelligence sharing. As Schulhofer notes, "US data-collection 
programs pose a far greater risk of chilling political dissent within the US than 
of chilling political activity by Germans or Canadians critical of their own 
301 Id. at 473. 
302 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 240. 
303 This framework also does not discuss control of voluntary disclosures by Internet 
Service Providers, an area that warrants further analysis in the future. 
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governments." 304 While foreign governments are less likely to respect an 
individual's privacy interests, they also have limited means to suppress rights 
abroad. Thus, to the extent that intelligence sharing serves to provide data on 
foreigners, some privacy concerns are diminished.3os 
Additionally, the flexibilities of this approach make this framework 
practicable. The framework governs intelligence sharing practices yet places 
a light touch on the surveillance methods employed in each country. Privacy 
idealists too often ignore that a failure to grant intelligence operations special 
treatment will result in widespread noncompliance. 306 After all, law as 
practiced within the "real world" context- operating under an operational 
code-are viewed as lawful by those operators. 307 This remains true even 
when those operational laws deviate from the established myth system. 308 
Following Asaf Lubin' s lead, this Article urges a practical orientation that 
would shatter the "Geneva echo chamber" and reintroduce government 
stakeholders into the discussion.309 Furthermore, while some might find 
attractive the notion of disregarding foreign balances, the reality is that 
"countries with different values, ... for instance, the BRICS countries310 are 
gaining more economic power." 311 The BRIC countries are not only growing 
in economic power, but many also have extensive intelligence apparatuses. 
304 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 260. 
305 This is not to say that information sharing does not cause any privacy harm. Many 
of the privacy concerns outlined in Part 0 still apply. 
306 See Deeks, supra note 63, at 602 ("The formalists ignore that there is something 
unique about intelligence activity, and that requiring intelligence services to play by 
precisely the same rules as law enforcement, diplomatic, and military actors is doomed 
to produce state noncompliance."). 
307 Lubin, supra note 51, at 511 (citing W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and 
Operational Code, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 229, 230 (1977)). 
3os Id. 
309 Id. at 551-52 ("This piece proposes recognizing the legitimacy behind certain 
limited legal differentiations in treatment for domestic and foreign surveillance. Such 
recognition, quite a concession on the part of the 'Geneva echo chamber,' would bring 
government agencies back to the table."). 
310 See BRIC, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ 
dictionary/english/bric (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (referring to the economic pact 
comprised of Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
311 Hijmans, supra note 218, at 459. 
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These countries are developing the economic strength to withstand regulatory 
imperialism, and the need for information sharing means that their interests 
cannot simply be ignored. In short, this paper incorporates flexibilities, and 
by doing so, promulgates standards that could actually work. 
B. Undermines Democratic Accountability 
A similar critique suggests that an international framework undermines 
democratic accountability. Contrary to these complaints, this international 
framework will strengthen the role of civil society in holding governments 
accountable. Some activists have suggested that any international privacy 
sharing agreement would "sideline the courts, disempower legislative bodies 
and privacy advocates, defuse commercial pressure for strong privacy 
safeguards, and create a dynamic controlled almost exclusively by the 
executive and its national security establishment." 312 However, this fear 
ignores the limited control that civil society currently exerts - intelligence 
sharing remains a black box. By bringing (more) sunshine to the shadows of 
intelligence cooperation, privacy activists will receive the benefit of pushing 
standards and accountability into these practice areas. Even more 
importantly, the intelligence-sharing framework furthers transparency in far 
less privacy-sympathetic regimes, thereby providing an avenue for civil 
society to make further inroads on government accountability. 
C. International Agreements Are Unrealistic 
Many scholars view the notion of any international information-sharing 
regime as a fanciful one. While proposing international agreements might be 
an attractive theoretical exercise, many question the practical utility of 
pushing for "an international treaty forged out of pixie dust." 313 In other 
words, even if one accepts the principles outlined under the proposed 
framework, states would never agree to an international treaty. Academics 
provide many reasons for their skepticism: varying privacy commitments, 
foreign mistrust, and state sovereignty concerns. 
312 Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 240. 
313 Woods, supra note 59, at 781. 
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i. Irreconcilable Ideological Differences 
Doubters suggest that states' different privacy-security balances pose an 
insuperable barrier to intelligence sharing. This perspective posits a 
"probably unbridgeable-gulf" between different states' commitment to 
privacy protection.314 As one skeptic reports, "There is absence of global 
consensus at an aspirational level, in particular, where this approach implies 
agreement with countries that do not share basic democratic values." 315 
Another suggests that an international agreement "will necessarily be 
based on a lowest common denominator." 316 These realists are correct to 
recognize the different surveillance standards across countries, and an attempt 
to coerce all states to a uniform practices would not succeed. The proposed 
framework recognizes this ideological reality, and grants states significant 
discretion in the ways that they carry out intelligence work. Instead of 
prescribing an ideological viewpoint, the framework sidesteps these 
unyielding ideological positions by requiring unobjectionable procedural 
processes that facilitate the unifying interest in accessing critical intelligence. 
ii. Too Much Foreign Mistrust 
Another critique dismisses an intelligence-sharing agreement as unattainable 
due to an insufficient level of popular trust. While citizens might submit to 
some degree of surveillance by their own government, they would not 
necessarily agree to similar oversight by foreign entities. As one observer put 
it, "Brits may have become used to the CCTV cameras and Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition technology that allows their own government to monitor 
their travel - but they would be considerably more dubious about letting the 
Germans and the French do the same." 317 While some citizens will 
314 See Schulhofer, supra note 51, at 254 (asserting that, notwithstanding existing 
frameworks between the United States and other Western states, "the complexity of 
the issues and the diametric opposition" ensure that progress "will be arduous and 
slow"). 
31s Hijmans, supra note 218, at 491. 
316 See Woods, supra note 59, at 788. 
317 Robin Simcox, Europe, Stop Trying To Make 'Intelligence Sharing' Happen, FOREIGN 
PoL'Y (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:19PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/14/europe-stop-trying-
to-mak-brussels-paris-bombings. 
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undoubtedly find this scope unsettling, this discomfort would not likely pose 
a practical barrier. This is the case for several reasons. First, the procedural 
safeguards significantly reduce the degree of the privacy harm. States can 
only share information under heavily prescribed circumstances. The fact that 
only foreign intelligence officials can access the information would also 
significantly diminish citizen reticence. The average citizen is unlikely to fear 
that he or she will be a subject of a foreign national security investigation. As 
a result, most citizens will not see this law as impacting their lives. Moreover, 
the notification regime requiring home states to notify individuals whenever 
foreign intelligence agencies access their private information will further 
mollify citizen concerns. In short, the intelligence-sharing framework 
sufficiently curtails citizens' privacy risks to avoid popular resistance. 
iii. Compromises State Sovereignty 
Another critique questions this framework as hobbling state sovereignty. 
According to this argument, national governments will not submit to an 
agreement that limits their ownership over their privacy-security balance. 
Instead of the domestic national legislature determining the appropriate level 
of privacy intrusion, foreign states violate that national compact through 
sharing intelligence collected through different standards. This would be a 
legitimate concern, were it not for the presence of access controls. Through 
the exercise of access controls, states maintain control over their intelligence 
agencies' acceptable practices. Relatedly, it true that this framework facilitates 
intelligence sharing with foreign states that do not necessarily subscribe to the 
same privacy standards. However, it would be a mistake to consider 
intelligence sharing as diminishing state sovereign control. As Jennifer Daskal 
points out, "[T]his critique assumes a world that does not exist. It assumes 
that foreign governments will comply with the existing diplomatic procedures 
for accessing sought-after data rather than seeking out means of accessing the 
data unilaterally." 318 In the absence of intelligence agreements, foreign 
intelligence agencies would attempt to gather the same intelligence 
information by sweeping and privacy-invasive collection of raw data. By 
318 Daskal, supra note 50, at 497. 
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developing procedural limitations for the use of shared intelligence that 
render such invasive tactics less necessary, states reduce the incentive for 
costly foreign surveillance efforts. Therefore, the intelligence framework 
would likely allow states to exercise far greater sovereign control over the 
shared information. 
Others argue that state national security branches have little interest in 
allowing any further limitations on their near-absolute discretion over 
intelligence practices. In other words, government officials have a strong 
interest in maintaining the status quo. However, this approach overlooks the 
changing norms leading to a public expectancy of greater transparency over 
intelligence activities.319 Even those countries that do not face public pressure 
are indirectly impacted by this normative trend. The push for government 
accountability has jeopardized the ability for other states to receive foreign 
intelligence. Given the collective interest-and need-for intelligence sharing, 
governments have an interest in adopting procedural practices that will allow 
for intelligence sharing without compromising their national intelligence 
practices. Sovereign states enter international agreements that they view in 
their national interest, and adopting this framework promotes vital security 
interests. 
VII. PATHWAYS TO 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The proposed framework benefits from multiple avenues towards 
implementation. The first option is through unilateral, domestic legislation. 
Unlike many areas of the anarchic international arena, no collective action 
problem prevents unilateral adoption by individual states. As the public eye 
increasingly scrutinizes intelligence practices and calls for intelligence reform, 
states will also experience unprecedented constraints on intelligence sharing 
at a time when such sharing has never been more vital. The CJEU decisions 
in Schrems and Canada PNR320 are only the tip of the iceberg. As states fill out 
their surveillance jurisprudence, they will continue to proliferate incompatible 
319 Deeks, supra note 63, at 618 ("Overall, the public now expects greater transparency 
about intelligence activities and some governments have begun to provide it.") 
320 See Opinion 1/15, 'II 1, ECLI:EU:C:2017:592. 
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sharing regimes. Rather than continue their collision course with other 
privacy regimes, states can adopt these proposed procedures. As detailed 
above, states can adopt these procedures with minimal cost to their preferred 
privacy-security balance. 
In order to be maximally effective, states would want to adopt these 
regulations with their closest intelligence allies. Fortunately, preexisting 
cooperation abounds. As Orin Kerr reports, /1 A complex web of global, 
regional, and bilateral treaties now exists addressing a wide range of crimes, 
such as cybercrime, corruption, transnational organized crime, narcotics, and 
terrorism." 321 Nations have already adopted information-sharing agreements 
through MLATs322 and through financial intelligence cooperation.323 
Bilateral agreements also provide a promising approach. A small core of 
states pushing this framework through bilateral agreements could quickly 
lead to sustained momentum. The Group of Eight (GS) countries-made up 
of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, 
Canada, and Russia might be one place to start. The GS already has a history 
of coordinating regulatory efforts of a series of internet-related crimes, 
including industrial and state espionage. 324 The GS states' extensive 
intelligence capabilities grant this group exceptional influence over promoting 
321 Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the Dark Web: What 
Risks to International Relations and International Law?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 58, 61 (2017). 
322 See primer discussion on the United States' use of MLAT agreements, supra note 
13. 
323 Mara Lemos Stein, The Morning Risk Report: Financial-Intel-Sharing Groups Need 
Diversity, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Jan. 10, 2018, 7:32 AM), 
https://blogs. wsj. com/riskandcompliance/2018/01/10 /the-morning-risk-report-
financial-intel-sharing-groups-need-di versi ty; see also International Programs, U.S. 
DEP'T TREASURY: FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/international-programs (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) 
("FinCEN is one of the most active FIUs in the world in terms of exchanging 
information with counterpart FIUs. The demand for FinCEN's services from foreign 
FIUs has expanded dramatically over the past decade."). 
324 Ghappour, supra note 159, at 1131 (citing Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of 
the Internet: A Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135, 147 (2000)). 
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such a framework. 325 This could arise through an informal agreement, or even 
the development of a multinational institution. 
Financial intelligence cooperation shows the promise of such an approach. 
The effort to promote financial intelligence exchange has led to the 
development of a distinct international institution, the Egmont Group, 
comprised of 155 Financial Intelligence Units.326 Egmont has played a role in 
responding to terrorist financing and provided a secure technological 
platform for financial intelligence exchange.327 The long-term establishment 
of such an organization could help reduce information costs of monitoring 
intelligence-sharing which states have legislated sufficient procedural 
safeguards. 
Formal international treaties offer another way forward. These 
agreements can move through the United Nations, which some have argued 
presents "the legitimate forum for the negotiation of a global legal 
framework." 328 However, others have argued that adopting an international 
agreement would trade efficiency for a cumbersome process that could 
prolong and delay adoption of new domestic legislation. 329 Nevertheless, 
formal international agreements could clarify the specific elements of the 
framework and ensure that all states are applying the same framework. As 
intelligence sharing becomes a more regulated practice, a treaty might help 
codify a widespread state practice. At this time, such an approach would 
likely be premature. 
325 American data providers' dominance over the global market gives the United 
States in particular tremendous leverage in facilitating an intelligence-sharing regime. 
See Daskal, supra note 51, at 474. 
326 About, EGMONT GROUP, https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/about (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2018). 
327 Egmont Group, Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Annual Report 2015-2016 
11 (2017), https://egmontgroup.org/en/filedepot_download/1660/45. 
328 Report on the meeting of the Expert Group to Conduct a Comprehensive Study 
on Cybercrime, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.4/2017/4, '[43 (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://www.unodc.org/ documents/ organized-crime/ cybercrime/Cybercrime-April-
2017 /Cybercrime_report_2017 /Report_ Cyber_E.pdf. 
329 Koops & Goodwin, supra note 32, at 83 .. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the early 21st century, the international community remains comprised of 
independent, sovereign nation states. These sovereign states will choose 
different privacy security tradeoffs. Governments will need to navigate a way 
to maintain intelligence sharing in an age when government surveillance 
receives increasing scrutiny. As one British parliamentarian aptly articulated, 
"We need to face up to the challenge -not duck, ignore, or pretend it is not 
there-[t]o preserve the legal safeguards that ensure that our intelligence 
services can do their job."330 
The proposed intelligence framework offers a road forward; one that 
respects sovereign choices and also comports with international law. The 
proposed intelligence framework is practicable and promises unprecedented 
transparency in an area long devoid of legal governance. Countries 
implementing this framework would create unparalleled democratic 
accountability, without undermining intelligence officials' ability to do their 
jobs. Governments will be able to keep people safe and also provide 
meaningful privacy protection. As privacy activists demand greater 
transparency on intelligence sharing, both governments and privacy 
advocates should consider this framework as a compromise path forward. In 
short, this framework empowers countries to transform the impending clash 
of privacy-security regimes into an opportunity for a new era of global 
cooperation and transparency. 
33015 Mar. 2018, Parl. Deb HC (2018) col. 158, https://hansard.parliament.uk/ 
commons/2018-03-15/debates/831521d4-17 4f-4150-9099-
7817 a9e28f8b/DataProtectionBill (click PDF and HTML downloads; select "Data 
Protection Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)). 
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